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THE NEGRO MILITIA DURING RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION

BY OTIS A. SINGLETARY*

One of the strangest experiments in American military history occurred in the South during the Reconstruction period. In order to implement their plan for a Republican South, the Radicals realized the necessity of furnishing their newly created state governments with sufficient force to perpetuate their existence amidst the undisguised hostility of a potentially destructive local opposition. In an attempt to provide such protection, state militia forces were organized which, unfortunately for the avowed program, were composed primarily of Negroes. This militia was launched upon a career which involved them in guerilla campaigns, naval engagements, international diplomatic complications, and several full-scale pitched battles complete with artillery, cavalry, and deployment of troops. Within a decade the Radicals witnessed not only the failure of this militia movement but with it the hopeless disintegration of their dream of a Republican South. Such failures, however, are frequently as instructive to the historian as those more fortunate movements which are rewarded with success for they, too, are inextricably woven into the historical fabric of the period. Yet even if this were not true, the story of the Negro militia movement, intricate in design and colorful in execution, would still be worth telling.

The Radicals realized that in order to

create an effective force of their own they must first destroy existing armed counter forces within the Southern states. This meant the destruction of the militia forces which had been organized by the provisional governors to combat the evils which accompanied the paralysis of local government in the immediate post-war period. This provisional militia, actively anti-Republican, was abolished with comparative ease largely due to their own shortsighted actions. Membership had been restricted to whites only and was composed primarily of ex-rebel soldiers who persisted in wearing their Confederate gray. Their activity had been frankly terroristic, aimed directly at Negroes who displayed a tendency to assert their newly granted independence. In spite of repeated warnings to militia detachments not to take the law into their own hands, freedmen continued to be assaulted and frequently killed by state troops. These repeated acts of violence forced officials to disband or otherwise curtail militia activities.¹ Operations of this nature, properly publicized, greatly aided the Radicals in their campaign to popularize the idea that these state militias had been organized for "the distinct purpose of enforcing the authority of the whites over the blacks."²

On March 2, 1867, the same day the first of the Reconstruction Acts was passed, the Radicals provided for the abolition of provisional militia forces. By means of an obscure rider attached to the annual Appropriation Act for the Army, all such forces were ordered to be disbanded and the "further

*In its original form this paper was read by Dr. Singletary before a sectional meeting of the American Historical Association at the Conrad Hilton Hotel in Chicago, Dec. 28, 1953. It is based upon his longer study, "The Negro Militia Movement During Radical Reconstruction," which won the 1954 Moncado Book Fund Award of the American Military Institute. Dr. Singletary is now a member of the history faculty at the University of Texas.

¹John T. Trowbridge, *A Picture of the Desolated States and the Work of Restoration, 1865-1868* (Hartford, 1868), p. 408.

²Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 36.

organization, arming, or calling into service of said militia forces" was prohibited until "authorized by Congress."³ Such authorization was normally granted to local Radical administrations which were created through the processes of the Reconstruction Acts. By early March, 1869, the prohibition had been removed insofar as North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, and Arkansas were concerned. Four other states were specifically exempted from militia privileges due primarily to the insecurity of the Radical position in those states. Neither Virginia nor Texas had as yet completed their constitutions, and Mississippi had pointedly rejected the one proposed. Georgia was in national disfavor for her intemperate action in having arbitrarily unseated many of the Negro legislators which the costly machinery of the Reconstruction Acts had so laborously aided in electing. Not until July 15, 1870, when these four recalcitrant states appeared to be safely in the Radical fold, were they authorized to form a militia.⁴

Acting on the legal basis so provided, local Radicals assumed the offensive employing an organizational technique which followed a fairly definite pattern. The first step was to bring to public notice the need for a protective force. Incumbent Radical governors were voluble spokesmen in support of the plan and they were aided by highly publicized reports of legislative investigating committees stressing the general lawlessness of the period. When the local political barometer indicated the propitious moment, governors then issued official appeals to their respective legislatures. The tone of these requests varied.

³*Congressional Globe*, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 217. President Johnson felt compelled to sign the Appropriation Act but he also sent a communication to Congress protesting the unconstitutionality of the militia prohibition.

⁴*Ibid.*, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 738. By this date the ultra-Radical Edmund J. Davis had triumphed in Texas; Virginia and Mississippi had accepted compromise constitutions; and General Alfred H. Terry had again clamped military rule on Georgia.

Governor Powell Clayton demanded that the Arkansas legislature act at once,⁵ Governor Holden of North Carolina pleaded for legislative support in his state,⁶ and Parson Brownlow characteristically promised to bring peace to Tennessee if he had "to shoot and hang every man concerned."⁷

In answer to these gubernatorial appeals, state legislators drafted and enacted militia laws which, although varying in detail from state to state, were quite similar in their fundamental provisions. In general, they created a military force composed of persons between the ages of 18 and 45, divided into two components. The State Guard was composed of active-duty personnel while the Reserve Militia furnished a reservoir of manpower for necessary mobilization. The governor was ex-officio commander-in-chief, with explicit power to call out the militia whenever in his opinion circumstances might warrant such action. He was further empowered to assess and collect taxes from troublesome counties in order to defray costs of militia operations therein. His personal grip on the militia was virtually assured by placing in his hands complete control over the selection of officers. Exemption clauses, under the terms of which less belligerent members of the community might avoid military service in return for payment of an annual tax to the military fund, were common. Only two states, however, were possessed of the necessary piety to recognize that some few members of their society rendered things other than to Caesar. Any North Carolinian imbued with "religious scruples" was constitutionally excused from militia service,⁸ and professed conscientious objectors in Arkansas were excluded

⁵Powell Clayton, *The Aftermath of the Civil War in Arkansas* (New York, 1915), p. 41.

⁶William W. Holden, *Memoirs* (Durham, 1911), p. 121.

⁷James W. Patton, *Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 1860-1869* (Chapel Hill, 1934), p. 86.

⁸This is specifically stated in the North Carolina Constitution of 1868.

from involuntary service by a specific clause written into the law.⁹

Recruiting was begun on the basis of these laws and although enrollment was legally open to both races, it soon became apparent that a majority of volunteers were Negroes. Such a situation was the inevitable result of circumstances. On the one hand, a considerable number of whites were officially discouraged from enlisting because of justifiable Radical suspicions concerning their intent. On the other, it was undeniably true that the Negro had ample reason to be devoted to the Republican cause. In the delightful novelty of his freedom, the Negro did not forget the men who had made that freedom possible. And since the Negro was circumstantially a Republican, it was quite natural for him to support party programs. This was particularly true of the militia project where participation could be interpreted as a personal defense of his freedom.

Political affinity was, however, only one of the factors which made the Negro a willing recruit. The pay, normally the same as that received by equivalent grade or rank in the United States Army, was enticing. Certainly it must have appeared magnificent in the eyes of the average field hand. Then, too, the perennial appeal of the uniform must have exercised some influence, especially since regulations were lax enough to allow the sporting of an occasional plume or feather. The promised relief from the routine drudgery of plantation work accounted for many more volunteers. The drills, parades, barbecues and speeches offered a pleasant break in the monotony, and "playin sogers" was considered a delightful game.¹⁰ Perhaps the most important single factor, however, in explaining Negro enlistment was social pressure. Negro women, emulating the role played by

their white sisters of the South during the Civil War, were the most effective recruiters for the militia. Failure to show interest in the movement automatically caused the male Negro to become politically suspect and gave rise to a most rigorous program of discrimination at the hands of the women. Negro men charged with political infidelity were socially isolated; they encountered increasing difficulty in persuading a woman even to accept their laundry. Expulsion from the local church was not considered too extreme a punishment and on several occasions groups of irate females publicly assaulted and tore the clothing off suspected shirkers. In cases involving reluctant husbands, wives were known to have imposed restraints which most certainly must have taxed the domestic relationship.¹¹ Such efforts were not without results, and under the additional pressure of circulated handbills bearing the appeal "To Arms! To Arms!! To Arms!!! Colored Men to the Front,"¹² the muster lists were rapidly filled.

Having successfully enrolled their troops, Radical governors were next faced with the difficult problem of arming and equipping them. The first endeavor was an attempt to borrow guns and ammunition from the armories of sympathetic Northern states.¹³ Although these appeals generally fell on deaf ears, Vermont did send a thousand Springfield rifles to aid in the Republicanization of North Carolina.¹⁴ Failing in this effort, the governors next turned to the Federal government in hopes of securing arms for their troops. Although their earliest overtures met with official rebuff, the continuance of vio-

¹¹This sampling of discrimination is taken from the sworn testimony of the victims. See *Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 48, I, 44th Cong., 2d Sess.*, pp. 556, 560, *et passim*.

¹²Cited in *House Misc. Doc. No. 211, 42d Cong., 2d Sess.*, p. 319.

¹³Governors Clayton, Warmoth, Reed, and Holden sent personal envoys on gun-raising expeditions in the North.

¹⁴James G. deRoulhac Hamilton, *Reconstruction in North Carolina* (New York, 1914), p. 346.

⁹Sec. I, Art. XI, Arkansas Constitution of 1868.

¹⁰John A. Leland, *A Voice From South Carolina* (Charleston, 1879), p. 49.

lence in the Southern states caused the administration to look with more favor on the possibility of providing arms. By early 1873, Congress passed a law authorizing the distribution of Federal arms to Southern states on a quota basis.¹⁵ In practice, this system proved quite flexible. Governor Scott, for example, persuaded the authorities to issue South Carolina its quota for the next twenty years in advance.¹⁶

In spite of so auspicious a beginning, the militia movement ended in dismal failure. By 1877, it was apparent that the last of the Radical state governments were doomed and that the Negro militia forces had either been destroyed, disbanded, or rendered militarily ineffective. In order to explain this failure, one must take into account the subtle and complex factors which made failure inevitable.

Certainly the lack of adequate Federal support of the militia movement contributed to its failure. In a very real sense, the Southern Radicals were abandoned by their colleagues in the national Republican administration. After their initial surge of enthusiasm for the militia project, these national Radicals, reacting to the pressure of a changing Northern public opinion, cooled noticeably in their support.¹⁷ This condition was not without effect in the South, for in almost direct proportion, as fear of Federal intervention waned, the Southern whites grew bolder in their use of force and violence.

Another serious weakness in the militia movement stemmed from a combination of

internal conditions which undermined the potential effectiveness of the troops. In the first place, it is glaringly obvious that they were unwisely handled. Radical governors, themselves, displayed an alarming lack of confidence in their militia, and were reluctant to employ them. Governors Brownlow of Tennessee, Lewis of Alabama, Ames of Mississippi, and Reed of Florida were all, at one time or another, haunted by the specter of race war. Their unwillingness to mount an all-out offensive proved them to be either ignorant of or unwilling to subscribe to the realistic theorem which asserts that "social revolutions are not accomplished by force, unless that force is overwhelming, merciless, and continued over a long period."¹⁸

Military leadership was equally feckless due to the inferior quality of the officer corps. Although some commanders were both competent and conscientious, the over-all level was very low indeed.¹⁹ Lack of interest was reflected in their failure to properly uniform and arm themselves and in irregular attendance at drills and musters.²⁰ Unauthorized absences from their command gave cause for concern,²¹ and violations of even the most elementary code of military conduct were responsible for innumerable courts-martial where "drunkenness and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" were popular charges.²² One inspecting officer reported to his superiors:

The officers in this brigade are inefficient and incompetent to a degree that constrains me to

¹⁸Vernon L. Wharton, *The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890* (Chapel Hill, 1947), p. 198.

¹⁹This unfortunate situation resulted from the fact that most officers were either political appointees or had been elected by the men, usually without regard for past experience or proven ability.

²⁰*Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Louisiana, 1874*, p. 60.

²¹In Tennessee, Gen. Joseph A. Cooper issued a circular warning officers against this practice. Copy of circular in AG Office File, Tenn. Dept. of Arch., Nashville.

²²This charge appears more frequently than any other in cases involving officers.

¹⁵Act of Mar. 3, 1873. See *Congressional Globe*, 42d Cong. 3d Sess., p. 300.

¹⁶Benjamin R. Tillman, *The Struggles of '76* (n.p., n.d.), p. 40. Pamphlet in writer's possession.

¹⁷Grant's refusal to intervene in both Texas and Mississippi at crucial periods of the struggle in those states furnish obvious examples of abandonment. That Northern public opinion applied restraining pressures on Grant's Southern policy is undeniable. Consider the furor which was created in the North as a result of General Sheridan's "banditti" message from New Orleans in early 1875.

request that they be ordered before a Board of Examinations to pass upon the question of their fitness for the positions which they now hold.²³

Still another cause for the ineffectiveness of the militia resulted from the fact that they were improperly cared for. The paymaster was continually in arrears. Like soldiers of any army in any age, these men looked forward to pay day and its attendant pleasures and when this occasion was overlooked, anger and dissatisfaction were immediately voiced. This situation was further aggravated by the poor conditions under which militiamen were forced to live. Although every army complains of its food, such protests were not entirely without justification in this instance. Troopers complained about the "irregular manner" in which they received their rations and were particularly vociferous whenever denied "an allowance of coffee, sugar and other necessities pertaining to a soldier's allowance."²⁴ One private wrote the following dismal description:

We have never had a change of diet, which you know is contrary to the laws of nature, hygiene, and army regulations. We draw meal, bacon, sugar and coffee and occasionally a small quantity of beans, salt and soup, all of which is deficient in quantity and inferior in quality. . . .²⁵

Shortages of equipment as well as food, gave additional cause for discontent. Requests for arms and ammunition were continually being forwarded to headquarters by commanders in the field. Lack of uniform equipment caused considerable discomfort and one officer reported that many of his men "had not sufficient clothing to protect them in ordinary weather, much less when exposed. . . ."²⁶ Medical attention, when furnished at

all, was of the most casual type and was restrictive in nature. For example, Gen. Joseph A. Cooper instructed commanding officers of Tennessee State Guard units that in cases of sickness due to misconduct, which is the military euphemism for venereal disease, physicians should not be allowed "to medicate at the expense of the state" but at the expense of the person "so afflicted."²⁷ The unevenness with which military justice was dispensed did nothing to improve the morale of militiamen. For example, a Tennessee private found guilty of desertion was subjected to the humiliation of being

dishonorably drummed out of camp and the service of the State of Tennessee with one side of his head shorn and [his] right breast bearing the inscription Deserter in large and plain characters [and] marched to the tune of the Rogue's March escorted by a guard [to] at least one mile from camp.²⁸

On the other hand, a lieutenant in the Louisiana militia was found guilty of the impressive charges of "mutiny, insubordination, disobedience of orders, neglect of duty, contempt and disrespect to superior officers, conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline [and] conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," yet his sentence was merely to be reprimanded in General Orders.²⁹ Offended by men who were indifferent, inefficient, and more often than not, incompetent; neglected by the very politicians in whose interests they were called upon to fight; and living at times under frightful hardships, it is small wonder that the troops were militarily ineffective.

As a result of these circumstances, morale was extremely low. The accoutrements of war which had been issued militiamen were inadequately or improperly cared for. Uniforms were arbitrarily altered to suit the

²³Gen. Frank Morey to Gen. Henry Street, Dec 1, 1874, *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Louisiana*, 1874, p. 19.

²⁴R. B. Elliott to R. K. Scott, Sept. 13, 1869, Mil. Affairs File, S. C. Historical Comm., Columbia.

²⁵Quoted in Patton, *Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 1860-1869*, p. 198.

²⁶Col. . . . Watson to P. Clayton, Oct. 3, 1889, Clayton, *The Aftermath of the Civil War in Arkansas*, p. 126.

²⁷GO No. 7, Aug. 9, 1867, AG Office File, Tenn. Dept. of Arch., Nashville.

²⁸Order dated Mar. 4, 1869, AG Office File, Tenn. Dept. of Arch., Nashville.

²⁹GO No. 27, Oct. 8, 1874, *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Louisiana*, 1874, p. 56.

sartorial taste of the wearer, with cavalier indifference to existing regulations. Military discipline almost completely disappeared. Threats against officers' lives were not uncommon, and cases of actual mutiny were reported.³⁰ Disaffection and dissatisfaction found a ready outlet in desertion. Ranks were continually decimated as militiamen simply melted away from encampments.

Any attempt to analyze the failure of the militia movement must take into consideration the debilitation of militia forces which resulted from the slackening of presidential support, the lack of confidence on the part of local Radical leaders, and the subsequent disintegration of morale which was accompanied by the usual disastrous results. However, these were more in the nature of contributing causes for it is inescapably true that the fundamental factor explaining the failure of the militia experiment was the opposition put forth by Southern whites, who, in general, remained implacable in their hostility to the Negro troops.

The opposition of the whites was undoubtedly rooted in several causes. In the first place, the cost of the program generated considerable resentment.³¹ For not only were appropriated funds used to pay troops and procure the wherewithal to make war; this money also invariably became involved in the too prevalent corruption of the period. Through militia claims commissions vast sums of money passed into the pockets of persons whose only qualifications for such collections were the good fortune to be recog-

³⁰In Arkansas, Negro troops under Gen. Mallory rebelled, threatened his life, and were subsequently disbanded. John M. Harrell, *The Brooks and Baxter War* (St. Louis, 1893), p. 87.

³¹The following figures will throw some light on this point. The "Kirk-Holden War" cost North Carolinians almost \$75,000. Militia preparations in Tennessee cost over \$93,000 for one election period. Arkansas spent \$330,000 during the martial law period of 1868-69 and another \$200,000 during the Brooks-Baxter War in 1874. An investigating committee of the South Carolina legislature fixed the cost of militia operations in that state at \$375,000.

nized as avid supporters of incumbent administrations and the ability to swear to a falsehood. In Arkansas, the commissioner, himself, collected on at least two claims.³² Governor Scott used \$50,000 of militia money to bribe three members of the South Carolina legislature in order to avoid an impeachment trial. His adjutant general, Franklin J. Moses, Jr., purportedly made the greatest single financial killing of his entire career from militia funds, no mean accomplishment in view of the career concerned.³³ The office of adjutant general, through which the forces were commanded, became little more than a sinecure in which one could use the salary to reward the politically faithful. Nepotism was not uncommon in connection with appointments; Parson Brownlow, for example, found his son to be admirably qualified for the job, and he later elevated a nephew, Sam Hunt, to the office.³⁴ Similarly, Governor Davis filled the Texas post with a near relation, F. L. Britton.³⁵

In addition to the resentment resulting from costs and frauds related to the militia movement, considerable bitterness was also created by militia activities. Historians of Reconstruction differ widely in their accounts of these actions. Dunningites have almost uniformly pictured them as arrogant, swaggering bullies bent on a rapacious campaign of violence against and humiliation of the South. Revisionists, on the other hand, when they mention the Negro militia at all, tend to describe their activities as little more than a series of playful pranks committed by a troupe of benevolent comics. As is so often

³²Thomas S. Staples, *Reconstruction in Arkansas* (New York, 1923), p. 303.

³³Report of the Joint Investigating Committee on Public Frauds in South Carolina, 1877-1878 (Columbia, 1878), p. 672.

³⁴E. Merton Coulter, *William G. Brownlow: Fighting Parson of the Southern Highlands* (Chapel Hill, 1937), p. 267.

³⁵Clarence P. Denman, "The Office of Adjutant-General in Texas, 1835-81," *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XXVIII (1924), 302-23.

the case when two schools of thought assume such opposed positions, the truth lies somewhere in between. While militiamen were not nearly so vicious as they were portrayed by their Conservative enemies, they did from time to time become involved in activities which contributed to the deterioration of relations which led almost inevitably to outbreaks of violence.

By far the greatest area of activity for the Negro militia was in the realm of politics. Although originally organized as a protective force, these troops were inevitably converted into an aggressive political instrument and employed in various ways. They were exceptionally active during political campaigns not only in protecting Radical political meetings but in breaking up political rallies of the opposition. In many areas, they were assigned a definite role during the campaign. One officer reported to his superiors: "I will carry the election here with the militia. . . . I am giving out ammunition all the time."³⁶ In Mississippi, pre-election preparations were described in the following letter from Yazoo City:

Mr. Thompson My Dear

friend, it is with Pleasure I write you this to inform U of some politocal newse. They are preparing for the election very fast . . . [and] are buying ammunition. The colored folks have got 1600 army guns All prepared for business.³⁷

On election days, fully armed and uniformed militiamen were stationed around polling places and were frequently involved in election day disturbances and disorders.

Another area of political action in which the militia participated was in the numerous Statehouse struggles which took place during the period. As defenders of the Radical claimant, they were present during the Kel-

logg-McEnery squabble in Louisiana, the Coke-Davis contest in Texas, the Hampton-Chamberlain controversy in South Carolina, and, by some strange set of circumstances, they fought on both sides during the Brooks-Baxter War in Arkansas.

While pursuing these political assignments, the Negro troops committed certain acts which did much to aggravate already strained feelings. The most serious of these offenses were crimes of violence involving militiamen and they usually resulted in immediate and fierce retaliation. Several murders occurred in which militiamen were implicated.³⁸ Incendiarism was the immediate cause of the Ned Tennant troubles in South Carolina early in 1875.³⁹ Cases of actual or attempted rape did occur, though infrequently. In one such case, the offenders were tried, convicted, and executed by a military commission composed of other Negroes.⁴⁰

Less extreme but nonetheless annoying were the minor depredations and social annoyances committed by the troops. While operating in the field, "protection papers" were used to extort money from inhabitants; also, money was obtained from relatives of persons in custody of the militia in exchange for immediate release of the prisoners. The wedding of a prominent local couple in Johnson County, Arkansas, was broken up by a detachment of Negro troops in a still unexplained military diversion.⁴¹ When "Kirk's Lambs," as the North Carolina troops were derisively nicknamed, were stationed at Camp Holden, near Yanceyville, they very nearly provoked a riot by undressing and bathing within full view of the inhabitants of the

³⁸The Matt Stevens Case in South Carolina during 1871. A. P. Brown was shot in Franklin, Tenn., during May, 1867, by militiamen. Arkansas also had a "militia murder."

³⁹Francis B. Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman, South Carolinian* (Baton Rouge, 1944), pp. 60-61.

⁴⁰Clayton, *The Aftermath of the Civil War in Arkansas*, p. 128.

⁴¹Harrell, *The Brooks and Baxter War*, pp. 84-85.

³⁶Joe Crews to Constable . . . Hubbard, July 8, 1870, *Report of Joint Investigating Committee on Public Frauds in South Carolina, 1877-1878*, p. 675.

³⁷B. F. Eddin to . . . Thompson, July 31, 1875, quoted in A. T. Morgan, *Yazoo: On the Picket Line of Freedom In the South* (Washington, 1884), p. 452.

town.⁴²

Other annoyances of considerable nuisance value were directly connected with militia drills. Numerous crises were brought about as a result of militia companies marching "company front," forcing whites off the street. Then, too, militia captains seemed to have felt an irresistible compulsion to deliver incendiary speeches which, although received with great enthusiasm by the assembled troops, served only to enrage the whites. Shots were fired indiscriminately by militiamen going to musters; using guns furnished them by the state, they visited their spite on their white neighbors' property. Livestock were frequently ambushed, and the white man's dog, that creature which so often out-distanced its master in noisily discriminating against the black man, became a favorite target.⁴³ Every drill squad somehow managed to obtain a drum, and the evening calm was shattered by the steady cadence of their heat. Many fights resulted from attempts by whites to silence these nocturnal poundings.⁴⁴ Certain more favored units had, in addition to their drummers, full scale military bands whose musicians eagerly contributed to the general din. That these bands played a role involving more than music is strongly suggested by the following request from a band-leader to the Radical governor of his state: "I would like to borrow about 24 guns for the use of our brass band. . . ."⁴⁵

The resentment created as a result of those activities and the costs and frauds involved in the militia project might be sufficient to explain to the casual observer the reasons for the white man's opposition. Any such conclusion, however, would be misleading.

⁴²Hamilton, *Reconstruction in North Carolina*, p. 516.

⁴³House Report No. 22, Pt. 3, II, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 467.

⁴⁴For example, see *Harper's Weekly*, Sept. 11, 1875, concerning the riot at New Hope Church, Miss.

⁴⁵H. Smith to A. Ames, Aug. 30, 1875, *Sen. Report* No. 527, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 25.

Even had this militia refrained from committing a single act antagonistic to the whites, it would still have been destroyed. A Negro historian cuts right through to the heart of the matter with the following statement:

The very fact that the Negro wore a uniform and thereby enjoyed certain rights was an affront to most Southern whites.⁴⁶

This racial affront was at the very core of the white man's opposition to the Negro militia. From racial bitterness it is but a short step to racial conflict; consequently, that strain of violence which runs with such persistence through the course of Southern history was once again thrown into bold relief as the opposition of the whites to the militia mounted.

The measures adopted by the whites were varied in nature. At first, they confined themselves to measures short of actual violence. The power of the Conservative-controlled press was used to influence public opinion against the militia from the very outset of the experiment. In addition, Conservative political leaders led the fight in state legislatures against passage of militia laws or enabling acts. When unable to defeat these appropriations outright, they resorted to legal stratagems, using the injunction to prevent expenditure of militia funds pending the outcome of involved and time-consuming court battles.⁴⁷ Social ostracism was relentlessly enforced against whites who were in any way connected with the militia,⁴⁸ and economic discrimination was visited upon militiamen themselves. Whites bound themselves by oath neither to rent land nor give employment to Negro militiamen and the pledge was strictly adhered to, since social alienation was the reward of the apostate. Taunts and personal insults were hurled at

⁴⁶E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro in the United States* (New York, 1949), p. 145.

⁴⁷The injunction was employed for this purpose in North Carolina, Louisiana and Mississippi.

⁴⁸The post-war career of Gen. James Longstreet, in Louisiana, is the most obvious example in social ostracism.

the militia constantly. The North Carolina State Militia, because of the initials N.C.S.M. which appeared on their insignia, were derisively called the "Negro, Carpetbag, Scalawag Militia,"⁴⁹ and local newspapers continually printed such queries as: "Why do not the white Radicals volunteer in the colored militia? They are just as good as the colored men."⁵⁰

Acts of a more threatening nature followed. A general policy of intimidation was inaugurated, in the course of which Negro leaders were ostentatiously enrolled in "Dead Books,"⁵¹ and coffins were paraded through the streets marked with the names of prominent Radicals and labelled with inscriptions bearing such intelligence as "Dead, damned, and delivered."⁵² Terrorization by cannonading was another method of intimidation employed by the whites,⁵³ and individual Negroes were frequently disarmed.⁵⁴

Seizures of arms destined for delivery to militia forces were not uncommon. Governor Clayton of Arkansas lost a shipment of four thousand rifles, four hundred thousand rounds of cartridges, a million and a half percussion caps, and a large quantity of gunpowder while attempting to transport them from Memphis to Little Rock. The *Hesper*, a steamer which Clayton had chartered for the trip, was boarded by a party of masked men aboard the tug *Nettie Jones* and the en-

tire consignment was dumped into the muddy waters of the Mississippi River.⁵⁵ Governor Reed suffered a similar misfortune in Florida. Two thousand rifles which had been purchased in the North were seized on the night of November 6, 1868, in a daring train robbery, and the rifles were either carried away or deliberately broken.⁵⁶ In South Carolina, a handful of volunteers from Charleston sailed aboard two pleasure yachts, the *Eleanor* and the *Flirt*, to Savannah where they overpowered the guards at the depot and pirated away the arms temporarily in storage there, awaiting distribution to militia units.⁵⁷

To avoid these losses, governors resorted to subterfuge when shipping arms. For example, a consignment of rifles was shipped into Newberry, South Carolina, marked "agricultural implements."⁵⁸ In Arkansas, two thousand Springfield rifles were sneaked in as "Arkansas State Reports" and thirteen thousand rounds of ammunition escaped detection only because the shipper had wisely labelled the cases "whiskey."⁵⁹

The tempo of violence increased as the whites turned to direct physical retaliation, not only against Negroes, but also against whites who were associated with the movement. George Kirk, who commanded the North Carolina forces of Governor Holden, landed in jail and his subordinate Bergen was driven from the state after having been run down by bloodhounds.⁶⁰ T. M. Shoffner,

⁴⁹Hamilton, *Reconstruction in North Carolina*, p. 347.

⁵⁰Hinds County (Miss.) *Gazette*, Oct. 13, 1875.

⁵¹Wharton, *The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890*, p. 188.

⁵²Testimony of John Ellis, *House Report No. 2*, 43d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 343-44.

⁵³In Mississippi, the Democrats borrowed a cannon from the commander of United States troops stationed in Jackson. During a subsequent parade, the gun was deliberately fired near enough to the governor's home to break several windows in the building. The federal officer was court-martialed for allowing his ordnance to be used in such manner. James W. Garner, *Reconstruction in Mississippi* (New York, 1901), p. 374.

⁵⁴Deposition of Sheriff John P. Matthews of Copiah County, Miss., Sept. 13, 1875, Adelbert Ames Papers, Miss. Dept. of Arch. and Hist., Jackson.

⁵⁵John G. Fletcher, *Arkansas* (Chapel Hill, 1947), p. 219; Clayton, *Aftermath of the Civil War in Arkansas*, p. 108; and *New York Daily Tribune*, Nov. 4, 1868.

⁵⁶*New York Times*, Nov. 7, 1868; and William W. Davis, *The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida* (New York, 1913), p. 567.

⁵⁷A. B. Williams, *Hampton and His Red Shirts* (Charleston, 1935), p. 225.

⁵⁸Columbia (S. C.) *Daily Register*, Aug. 15, 1876.

⁵⁹Benjamin S. Johnson, "The Brooks-Baxter War," *Publications of the Arkansas Historical Association*, II (1908), 122-74.

⁶⁰Hamilton, *Reconstruction in North Carolina*, p. 533; Holden, *Memoirs*, p. 91; and *Sen. Report No. 1*, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 152.

author of the North Carolina militia act, fled that state for the relative safety of Indiana upon learning of a plot to murder him and ship his body as a gift to Governor Holden.⁶¹ Joseph Crews, who had been the moving spirit behind the organization of Negro troops in Laurens, South Carolina, was ambushed and fatally wounded by a shotgun blast while riding in his buggy.⁶²

Retaliatory acts against whites were few in number in comparison to similar actions taken against Negro militiamen. Negro captains, in particular, were singled out for destruction and were remorselessly executed. Captain A. J. Haynes, for example, was murdered in the streets of Marion, Arkansas, in broad daylight. Clarence Collier, a local tough who at the tender age of twenty-one already had one notch in his gun handle, emptied both loads of a double-barrelled shotgun into Haynes's body, then fired five additional revolver shots into the corpse to make sure he was dead. Collier rode away from town unmolested.⁶³

An equally brutal murder was that of Charles Caldwell, the fiery mulatto state senator of Mississippi. Caldwell became a marked man for having fearlessly led an expedition from Jackson to Edward's Station carrying arms for distribution to the militia.⁶⁴ Some three months later he was murdered in Clinton while taking a "Christmas drink" with some local whites. The clinking of the glasses was the prearranged signal for his death, for a strategically placed killer held Caldwell in his gunsight. As the glasses touched, a rifle report shattered the quiet and the Negro fell bleeding to the floor.⁶⁵

A similar case was that of Jim Williams in

South Carolina. Williams, leader of a Negro militia unit in York county, had become a target of the whites because of his aggressive leadership, and they demanded that he disband his force.⁶⁶ His refusal to comply was his death warrant. Early in the morning of March 7, 1871, his body was found hanging in the public square with a large placard pinned to his corpse bearing this inscription: "Jim Williams gone to his last muster."⁶⁷

The death blow to the militia movement, however, was dealt by the organization of White Leagues, or Rifle Companies. These forces, essentially of a politico-military nature, were dedicated to the destruction of the Negro troops and the return of political control "into the hands of the white people...."⁶⁸ Armed by private subscription, and officered, in many instances, by experienced ex-Confederates, the White Leagues struck forceful blows directly at the Negro militia. From the ranks of the White League movement came the men who participated in those bloody affairs such as Vicksburg, Clinton, and Hamburg, where the whites effectively instituted a policy of disbandment through extermination.

In retrospect, it is fairly obvious that the Radicals, from the very beginning of their militia experiment, were presented with a paradox. Faced with the stern realities of political self-preservation, they had found it imperative to create a protective force, which due to peculiar local conditions developed into a Negro militia. It is ironic that the organization of this protective force caused so violent a reaction that it guaranteed the destruction of the very thing it was created to protect.

⁶¹Hamilton, *Reconstruction in North Carolina*, p. 470.

⁶²Leland, *A Voice From South Carolina*, p. 134; and *New York Herald*, Sept. 9, 1875.

⁶³Clayton, *Aftermath of the Civil War in Arkansas*, pp. 175-86.

⁶⁴Jackson (Miss.) *Weekly Clarion*, Oct. 20, 1875.

⁶⁵Testimony of Mrs. Charles Caldwell, *Sen. Report*

No. 527, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 435-40.

⁶⁶John S. Reynolds, *Reconstruction in South Carolina, 1867-1877* (Columbia, 1905), p. 188.

⁶⁷Louis F. Post, "A Carpetbagger In South Carolina," *Journal of Negro History*, X (1925), 61.

⁶⁸Opelousas (La.) *Courier*, July 4, 1874; and James Brewster, *Sketches of Southern Mystery, Treason, and Murder* (n.p., n.d.), p. 175.

THE WRITINGS OF STEPHEN B. LUCE

BY JOHN D. HAYES*
Rear Admiral, USN, Ret.

INTRODUCTION

REAR Admiral Stephen Bleeker Luce (1827-1917) is one of the little known "greats" of the United States Navy. His contributions to the Navy and to the military profession as a whole were many, but they were in the fields of administration and education where military fame is not easily gained. He is well known as the founder of the Naval War College but his accomplishments far exceed this. His foresight in establishing that college, against official opposition and ridicule, makes him the precursor of higher military education in the United States, for that institution predates the war colleges of the other services and the joint service colleges. To military historians Luce is the man who found Alfred Thayer Mahan, for he invited Mahan to give the series of lectures that evolved into the famous Sea Power series.

Before starting the Naval War College, Luce promoted legislation that resulted in the establishment of state maritime schools and he himself set up the first one in New York in 1874. He revived the naval apprentice system after the Civil War when the enlisted grades became filled with foreigners. He did this to encourage young Americans to take the Navy as a life's work. His Training Squadron for apprentices became the

Naval Training establishment of today.

Luce should be best known for his part in creating the present organization of the Navy Department. His efforts in this sphere went on for thirty years from 1882 to 1911, the period of the modern Navy's growth. He strove for a Navy Department capable of directing the fleets in the best interests of the country's security. The organization he helped to create has remained virtually unchanged through two major wars and the establishment of a Department of Defense.

However, the contributions of Stephen B. Luce to the U. S. Navy and to the military profession cannot be measured in tangible terms. Bradley Fiske, himself one of the Navy's beacons, has said of him, "Luce taught the Navy to think. . . . He taught the Navy to think about the Navy as a whole. . . . He saw that a navy in order to be good must be directed as an entity along a preconceived and definite line of strategy. . . . More clearly than any other man in American history, he saw the relations that ought to exist between the central government and its military and naval officers.

"Luce saw strategy as clearly as most of us see a material object. To him more than any other officer who ever lived are naval officers of every nation indebted for the understanding they have of their profession."¹

Mahan is usually given this credit, but to their contemporaries Luce was greater than

*Admiral Hayes, President of the American Military Institute, here presents a bibliographic essay and annotated list of thirty-six periodical articles by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce on naval administration and organization, military ethics, naval warfare, education, and training. Though on specific topics, in the aggregate these units form part of a developing structure of a philosophy of civil-military relations.

¹Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, "Stephen B. Luce, An Appreciation," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1917, p 1935.

Mahan. William E. Livezey, Mahan's latest commentator, has said of this: "In the United States, his [Mahan's] immediate influence on his fellow officers was probably less than that of the older, farsighted Luce or the younger, insurgent Sims, yet in the formation of public opinion he had no peer."²

Luce can be more aptly compared with Mahan's father, Dennis Hart Mahan, longtime professor at West Point, for he was first and foremost a teacher. He taught, he lectured, he wrote, he established schools. His students were midshipmen, apprentices, junior officers, senior officers, the Navy as a whole. He was not averse to giving the benefits of his advice to the civil heads of the Navy, a service not always appreciated.

Luce was a philosopher who was always putting his thoughts on paper. "He was persistent in his demands and prolific with his suggestions."³ He did this in articles for periodicals and in letters to friends in high places. This gave him an influence in his own time and enabled him to make a lasting imprint upon the Navy. It also contributed to his being forgotten when the men who knew him passed on for he never took the time to compose his thoughts into books as Mahan did and he refused to write an autobiography.⁴ So his message for future generations is not easily available on library shelves. It must be searched for in unpublished letter collections and in uncatalogued periodicals.

Elting E. Morison, the able biographer of Sims, comments on this: "In his *Life and Letters of Stephen B. Luce*, Albert Gleaves rescues this officer from ill deserved obscurity but one would wish for a more exhaustive study of the man for whom there can be no successor."⁵ Luce was undoubtedly the most

learned man that the U. S. Navy has produced. A definitive biography and a complete publication of his letters are long overdue.

The purpose of this paper is to bring Luce's writings on naval administration and warfare to the attention of military officers and students of civil-military relations. They form a major contribution to military literature and have a direct bearing on the security situation in which the United States finds itself today.

Luce entered the Navy as a midshipman in 1841. He retired from active service in 1889, when he reached the age of sixty-two. His retirement was far from inactive for he served on many boards and commissions and he was a member of the faculty of the Naval War College from 1901 to 1911. His last service was a classic paper on civil-military relations, published in 1911. He died in 1917 at the age of ninety.

When his friend William C. Church started the *Army and Navy Journal* in 1863, Luce contributed unsigned material for it and he continued doing so during Church's long editorship. He wrote his only nonprofessional articles for Church's other magazine, *The Galaxy*. These are important for the insight they give of Luce's character and erudition. He also wrote for now forgotten periodicals such as *Potter's American Monthly* and *The Youth's Companion* and for two encyclopedias.

The writings discussed here began with the establishment of the U. S. Naval Institute in 1873. Luce contributed the lead article in the first issue of its *Proceedings*. Later he was president of the Institute for eleven years and two-thirds of the articles listed here can be found in the volumes of the *Proceedings*. He was a frequent contributor to an-

²W. E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power* (1947), p. 272.

³D. N. Bigelow, *William Conant Church and the Army and Navy Journal* (1952), p. 204.

⁴Luce Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Library of Congress. Luce did write the first American textbook on *Seamanship* (1863) and edited a book of *Naval Songs* (1883).

⁵E. E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy* (1942), p. 538. Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Stephen B. Luce, Rear Admiral, USN* (1925).

other service periodical of the time, *The United Service*. After retirement he wrote for the *North American Review*. Later he had the best of these articles republished in the *Proceedings* to make them available in naval literature.

An annotated summary of the more important articles by Luce on professional subjects follows. As far as is possible the annotations are in Luce's own words. The articles are grouped by categories of general subjects, each category with a short introduction, as this seems to be the most logical arrangement showing the range of his interest and for aiding a study of his work. These categories are: *Naval Organization and Administration*, *Military Ethics*, *Naval Warfare*, *Naval History*, *Education of Officers*, and *Training*.

I

NAVAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

This aspect of the navy and his profession was a major interest to Luce, not because he liked problems of organization but because he saw that it was in this sphere that the most work had to be done. His interest, he admitted, was created by thoughts during the campaign off Charleston, S. C., in the Civil War. The Union Navy failed in this campaign and the reason for it, according to Luce, was that the Navy Department at the time was not organized to make naval policy or sound strategic plans. He commenced his efforts for better military direction within the Department in 1878 with a letter to the Chairman of the House Naval Committee. (See Gleaves, pp. 227-28.) His labors gradually bore fruit, first in the establishment of the General Board after the Spanish War, then in the system of aides to the Secretary in 1910, and finally in 1915 by legislation which created the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

OUR NAVAL POLICY. *The United Service*.

Vol. 6, pp. 501-21 (May, 1882). In this, his first article on the subject of naval organization and administration, Luce states: "A brief review of the history of our Navy during the first century of its existence will show that the United States have never had what is commonly known as a 'Naval Policy'." He then gives an excellent administrative history of the Navy Department to show that with eight autonomous bureaus it is impossible to recommend to Congress an over-all naval policy. Luce was still on the active list and he left this article unsigned.

ANNUAL ADDRESS, 1888, TO THE U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE. *Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute*.⁶ Vol. 14, pp. 1-8 (1888). Luce used this occasion to plead his thesis that the Navy needed a military head to direct its war planning. "We present the world the extraordinary spectacle of having a war machine under an organization confessedly unfit for war."

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION. *Proceedings*, Vol. 14, pp. 561-88 (1888). This classic in political science is perhaps the greatest of Luce's writings. Its logic was still sound fifteen years later when he published two sequels to it. It is still applicable today for problems of the Department of Defense. Luce points out the dualism of military and civil functions that is inherent in good naval organization. This dualism can be recognized today in the frequent use of such co-terms as "combat and support" and "operations and administration." Luce claimed that the trouble with the Navy Department of the time was that while it was properly organized on the civil side it was not organized at all on the military side.

NAVAL WARFARE UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS. *North American Review*, Vol. 162, pp. 70-7 (Jan., 1896). Luce had many

⁶Hereafter to be referred to as the *Proceedings*. Extracts are reprinted with the permission of the U. S. Naval Institute.

articles published in this magazine over a period of twenty-two years. In this one he uses the Italian naval defeat at Lissa in 1866 to show the danger of not having a naval general staff to develop sound naval policy. He attributed the Japanese success in the war with China in 1894 to proper organization of the Japanese Navy Department: "In every naval government there should reside some wise direction whose special and exclusive duty would be to deal with the mobilization of the fleet and the direction of its military movements."

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION II. *Proceedings*, Vol. 28, pp. 839-49 (Dec., 1902) This is the first of two sequels to the paper of 1888 with the same title. Here Luce explains the naval administration of Great Britain and then outlines our own defective organization. He gives the example of the failure of the Navy Department at the outbreak of the war with Spain to send any instructions to Admiral Dewey. "The Trafalgar campaign," he writes, "furnishes an apt illustration of . . . fundamental truth that the effectiveness of a military instrument — such as a navy — consists more in the method of its use and in the practical skill of the human element than in the material perfection of the weapon itself."

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION III. *Proceedings*, Vol. 29, pp. 809-21 (Dec., 1903). This article is composed of case instructions which was Luce's favorite method of teaching. The first "case" is that of the Dupont board which in the summer of 1861 planned the early Union naval strategy but which passed out of existence with the assignment of its members to other duties. The second "case" is the dismal failure of the campaign against Charleston. This article has Luce's delightful story of his meeting with General William T. Sherman. He attributed the original idea of the Naval War College to

this meeting.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY. *Proceedings*, Vol. 31, pp. 81-6 (Mar., 1905). This article received honorable mention in the Naval Institute Prize Essay Contest of 1905. 1905. Luce's theme again is that the Navy Department is not properly organized to carry out any improvements to itself: "What is needed is legislative action based on a liberal and enlightened consideration of the whole subject of naval organization from both the military and civilian view to the end that the several parts may be evenly balanced and nicely adjusted so that our naval organization may become a model of efficiency and economy."

THE FLEET. *North American Review*, Vol. 188, pp. 564-76 (Oct., 1908). Despite its title, this is another condemnation of the Navy Department organizational set-up which gave too much power to the Bureau Chiefs. William S. Sims, then President Roosevelt's naval aide, advised him to publish it in some popular magazine where it would attract the attention of the press and not in the *Proceedings* where exposures brought no apparent pressure to bear on the Navy Department.

Early in 1909, Luce was appointed by the President to a board which became known as the *Moody Commission*, after its chairman, former Secretary of the Navy, Moody. The purpose of this board was to study and recommend changes in the organization of the Navy Department. The board included Admiral Mahan and others then famous both in the Navy and in civil life. Luce, despite his years, hounded the Commission into getting its report to the Congress before adjournment in March, 1909. He circulated this article freely among the members, and the Commission's recommendations were essentially the ideas of Luce. Nothing came from Congress, but the new Secretary of the Navy under President Taft, George Von L.

Meyer, also received a copy from the persistent Luce. It was Meyer who took the initial steps that lead to the establishment of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

WANTED—AN ADMIRALTY STAFF. *Army and Navy Life* (successor of the *United Service*), Vol. 14, pp. 13-9, (Jan., 1909). This excellent presentation with a most appropriate title is a succinct summary of his previous articles on naval administration. It was another effort to inform the public directly of the needed reforms in the Navy Department. The complete Moody Report was printed in the March, 1909, issue of this periodical. Luce states: "*Naval Administration includes two separate and distinct parts, each one indispensable to the other, the civilian and the military. The employment of vessels of war should come under the military head; construction, armament and equipment of vessels belongs to the civilian branch.*"

ON THE TRUE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AND THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. *Proceedings*, Vol. 37, pp. 83-6 (Mar., 1911). In 23 short numbered paragraphs, Luce gives a summation of his ideas on the relation between the two pillars of naval preparation for war. The last paragraph is important because it shows wherein the concept of higher education for officers in the Navy differed from that of the Army, a difference still evident today. This concept, as expressed by Luce, is: "*The Naval War College is educational, not executive. It is not a war board or a naval general staff. It forms no part of the working organization of the Navy but supplies the material wherewith to construct such an organization.*"

THE BOARD OF NAVY COMMISSIONERS. *Proceedings*, Vol. 37, pp. 1113-35 (Dec., 1911). This is Luce's last published article. In it he sums up all his ideas of naval organization. He shows the dualism of function that is necessary for such organization, and then

traces the administrative history of the navy, with the assistance of charts, in terms of this organizational dualism. He indicates the specific periods in our naval history where each of the two functions were properly or improperly performed. At the end is a long analysis of the recommendations of the Moody Commission.

Luce concludes with, "*We have fashioned the instrument—the fleet; but have failed to provide the power to wield it as an instrument of war.*" At the age of eighty-four he ended his writing, still fighting.

II

MILITARY ETHICS

Luce's writing on military ethics stand in freshness of viewpoint only after those on naval administration. As a thinking naval officer, Luce knew from his extensive reading of history that the effects of war were not all bad. He was also a sincerely religious man. As few Americans have ever been able to do, he resolved the contradiction between the apparent cruelty and waste of war and the peaceful nature of the Christian tradition. He considered his articles on military ethics important for he had all three reprinted in the *Proceedings* many years after they were first published.

A POWERFUL NAVY NOT DANGEROUS TO CIVIL LIBERTY. *The United Service*, Vol. 2, pp. 109-13 (Jan., 1880). Reprinted in the *Proceedings*, Vol. 32, pp. 1069-75 (Sept. 1906). Luce takes issue with the view then popular that powerful navies are detrimental to national prosperity and dangerous to civil liberty. He proves historically that navies are compatible with democratic institutions, and shows that a respectable navy should be maintained from one sixth of the custom revenues provided from foreign commerce.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AS AN ELEMENT IN MILITARY EDUCATION. *The United Service*, Vol. 8, pp. 1-16 (Jan., 1883). Reprinted in the

Proceedings, Vol. 32, pp. 1367-86 (Dec. 1906). "Religion and war are the two great central facts of history. Around these two cluster pretty much all that is worth while knowing of the past. . . Religion gave birth to education. War led the way to civilization."

Luce shows the close intimacy that existed between the military profession and religious feeling in the ancient and early Christian worlds and gives examples of its existence in modern times. He is frankly critical of what today would be call "materialism" in the curricula of the national academies and the lack of attention given to the spiritual welfare of the cadets and midshipmen.

(1) THE BENEFITS OF WAR. (2) WAR AND ITS PREVENTION. Published under the first title in the *North American Review*, Vol. 153 pp. 672-83 (Dec., 1891). Reprinted in the *Proceedings* under the second title, Vol. 30, pp. 611-622, (Sept. 1904). Luce refutes the popular theory of the day that war is intrinsically evil, using testimony from the Bible. War, he claims, is one of nature's agencies for human progress. It is terrible while it lasts but is purifying in its results. It chastens a nation, stimulates national growth, and solves otherwise insoluble problems of the domestic and political economy. Luce holds that without the stimulation of the Persian Wars, Greece would have lived on asceticism and wasted its life on idle dreams. "Let practical Americans recognize the truth that war is a calamity that may overtake the most peaceful nation, and that insurance against war by preparation for it is the most business-like, the most humane and the most in accordance with the Christian religion."

III

NAVAL WARFARE

Had Luce composed his writings on naval warfare into book form he would be as well known today as Mahan. Many of his ex-

pressed principles of warfare antedate Mahan's and were the products of a lifetime of thinking on the subject.

ON THE STUDY OF NAVAL WARFARE AS A SCIENCE. *Proceedings*, Vol. 12, pp. 527-46 (1886). This and the succeeding article were early lectures at the War College. Luce holds that in the scientific study of naval warfare, principles are derived by induction from the study of history and then methods are derived by deduction from these principles. Naval and military science should be studied together as they are based on the same principles.

ON THE STUDY OF NAVAL HISTORY (GRAND TACTICS). *Proceedings*, Vol. 13, pp. 175-201 (1887). This penetrating study of naval warfare predated Mahan's classic by four years. Luce expresses in a few pages what Mahan took volumes to say; and he had a much more comprehensive knowledge of the French Navy. Luce here defied his professional contemporaries with the statement that history indicates that good soldiers are more capable of conducting the military movements of a fleet than a mere sailor who knows nothing of the science of war. At this time he was admittedly the Navy's best seaman and *Luce's Seamanship* was the standard text throughout the service.

OUR FUTURE NAVY. *Proceedings*, Vol. 15, pp. 542-52 (1889). Also in the *North American Review*, July, 1889. The theme is the need for battleships in the new navy. The United States at this time had none. A navy's duty is offensive and it should be composed of balanced fleets, each fleet being built around about twelve battleships. The number of fleets is to be determined by the geographical location and the political situation. This is the task-fleet principle in use today. He verifies his thesis with a wealth of historical examples and ends with: "A solitary American steel cruiser, with the delusive pre-

fix 'protected,' represents the latent possibilities of a great country placidly awaiting some national disaster to generate its mighty force."

AS TO NAVY YARDS AND THEIR DEFENSE. *Proceedings*, Vol. 21, pp. 680-89 (1895). The subject material is important but this is one of Luce's poorer articles. It was prepared from notes taken for his *Report on the Commission on Navy Yards* of twelve years before. The article does give a good history of the unplanned and haphazard manner in which the sites for navy yards were originally chosen.

THE STORY OF THE MONITOR. *Naval Actions and History, 1799-1898*. Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, Vol. 12, pp. 127-54, (1902).⁷ This article deals only with the strategic and diplomatic effects of the first battle between ironclads, especially the change in the attitude of Great Britain.

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, June 2, 1903. *Proceedings*, Vol. 29, pp. 537-45 (Sept., 1903). This is a synthesis of Luce's ideas on statesmanship, history, military ethics, and officer education. It is one of his best papers. He states that the aim of the Naval War College is to have officers discuss the higher branches of their profession and prepare themselves for the highest duties that can devolve upon a naval officer: "At the firing of the first gun proclaiming war, the so called inspiration of genius must be trusted only when it is the result of long and careful study and reflection."

NAVAL STRATEGY. *Proceedings*, Vol. 35, pp. 93-112 (Mar., 1909). This is a summary of the subject, filled with historical examples.

⁷An autographed reprint is in a bound volume of some of Luce's articles in the Navy Department Library. Similar bound volumes of reprints are in the Naval War College Library and the New York Public Library but none contains all his articles and no two of the volumes are identical.

Luce's extensive reading unearthed much generally unknown military wisdom. His papers would be of inestimable value to military scholars if the material in them were better referenced and footnoted. He gives considerable attention to the strategic importance of Hawaii, especially Pearl Harbor.

THE NAVY AND ITS NEEDS. *North American Review*, Vol. 193, pp. 494-507 (Apr., 1911). This is a public appeal for naval bases. The remarkable Luce, having finally succeeded in getting some military direction within the Navy department, now starts on a new tack and directs his talents and prestige to the correction of another defect in our national security, saying: "With the regeneration of the U. S. Navy, beginning in 1881, there arose the necessity for: (1) placing of the administration of the navy on a war footing; (2) the creation of a fleet; (3) the establishment of naval bases. By 1911, the first measure is in a fair way to accomplishment, and the second an accomplished fact, leaving only the third measure to be considered." Luce defines what is meant by a naval base, then a new term in the American language, gives examples of foreign naval bases and lists eleven requirements for a naval base to be of the first order.

THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR. *North American Review*, Vol. 194, pp. 612-27 (Oct., 1911). This is a book review of Admiral Chadwick's two volume history of that war. It is also an apologia and defense of Admiral William T. Sampson, good friend of Luce and commander of the naval force at the Battle of Santiago. Sampson was absent during the major portion of the battle. Luce takes issue with a claim that Santiago was a "Captains' fight." Sampson had planned the method of attack and everything would have been the same had he been there. Luce gives examples of "soldiers' fights" and "captains' fights" where commanders had

little effect on the issue and, also, examples of battles which were under the commander's control and direction at all times.

IV

NAVAL HISTORY

Luce was a historian of a high order but he wrote little history in the conventional sense. He was interested in historical analogy and the lessons history held for present problems and as a guide to the future.

FLEETS OF THE WORLD. *Proceedings*, Vol. 3, pp. 5-24 (1887). This article has the same name as a book by his friend, Commodore Foxall A. Parker and was supposed to be a book review. Instead, Luce gives a twenty-page naval history of the world. He regrets that none of the writers of antiquity thought it worth while to transmit a treatise on naval warfare to posterity. Luce calls attention to the first scientific treatment of naval warfare which was published in 1697. It is the work of Pere Paul Hoste, a Jesuit priest who served as professor and chaplain under the French admiral, De Tourville.

THE DAWN OF NAVAL HISTORY. *Proceedings*, Vol. 24, pp. 441-50 (1898). This rambling article reviews the records and literature on navies and early maritime activities up to the time of the great Athenian Navy which is the point where the article FLEETS OF THE WORLD began.

COMMODORE BIDDLE'S VISIT TO JAPAN IN 1846. *Proceedings*, Vol. 31, pp. 555-63 (Sept., 1905). This is a scholarly and informative presentation of the Navy's first effort to open Japan. Luce had participated in it, having served as a midshipman in Biddle's flagship, the line-of-battle ship, *Columbus*. The article was inspired by the fiftieth anniversary of Perry's expedition, the year before.

V

OFFICER EDUCATION

Luce is known primarily for establishing

the Naval War College but he was interested in all phases of officer education. He served for three tours at the Naval Academy, the last after the Civil War as Commandant of Midshipmen during the regime of dynamic Admiral David Dixon Porter. He also was a friend of General Emory Upton, the author of *The Military Policy of the United States*. Upton, although younger than Luce, exerted great influence on him in matters of officer education and the general staff.

WAR SCHOOLS. *Proceedings*, Vol. 9, pp. 663-67 (1883). This is Luce's initial effort to get some higher education for naval officers. The major portion of the article is a detailed prospectus of the U. S. Artillery School at Fortress Monroe which Upton had made into a model of military education. The article also has remarks on the Infantry and Cavalry Schools.

The naval officer, not less than the army officer, claims Luce, should possess a knowledge of the science and practice of war, "so far as it can be learned from books," and "he should be led into a philosophic study of naval history that he may be enabled to examine the great naval battles of the world with the cold eye of professional criticism, and to recognize where the principles of the science (of war) have been illustrated or where a disregard of them has led to defeat or disaster. Such studies might well occupy the best thoughts of the naval officer for they belong to the highest branches of his profession."

UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. *The United Service*, Vol. 12, pp. 79-90 (Jan., 1885). Luce gives the aims of the new War College and describes the course of study that will be undertaken. A considerable part of the article is devoted to reviewing and quoting from a report of a board on postgraduate education. Luce was the senior member of this board which resulted in the

establishment of the Naval War College by a general order of the Secretary of the Navy, dated October 4, 1884. Says Luce: "*The naval student reading military history can hardly fail to be struck by the similarity between hostile operations on shore and those afloat.*" He composes a naval definition for Jomini's term "logistics" and thereby introduces it into the naval language from which it has been taken for general military usage today. He also introduced, for the first time, the notion of a naval chief of staff.

A PLEA FOR AN ENGINEER CORPS IN THE NAVY. *North American Review*, Vol. 182, pp. 74-83 (Jan., 1906). Luce was interested in technical education of officers and as early as 1875 he endeavored to get Professor Rodgers, the first President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to establish a school of naval architecture and marine engineering. He did not believe, however, that studies of the technical sciences and of the art of war were compatible. For this reason he was against training cadet engineers at the Naval Academy and the amalgamation, in 1899, of the Engineer Corps with the Line.

THE U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. *Proceedings*, Vol. 36, pp. 559-86, 683-96 (June and September, 1910). These two articles comprised the only available published history of the Naval War College. The first is a chronology of the problems and accomplishments of the College and an analysis of its curricula and methods. The second discusses important phases such as the work of Captain Henry C. Taylor, the third President, and of W. McCarthy Little who introduced the naval war game. Luce has something to say about the Army War College and the British, French, and German Naval War Colleges, all of which followed his creation. He points out the contribution that the College has made to the study and prac-

tice of International Law: "*It has accomplished to some extent what it set out to do, bring young officers to a realizing sense of the true significance, variety and extent of their profession.*"

ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AND THE LINE OFFICERS OF THE NAVY. *Proceedings*, Vol. 37, pp. 785-99 (Sept., 1911). This last address that Luce made to the Naval War College illumines his character. He was now 84 years old and he had returned to inactive duty the previous year. He could have taken this as an opportunity to reminisce. Instead he chose to make a fighting speech about the future of the naval profession. He was frankly worried because there was so much interest in the new postgraduate school of engineering, and still so little in the War College, showing that officers were not interested in the main purpose of their profession: "*Your profession is the art of war and nature will be avenged if you violate one of its laws in undertaking to make a part greater than the whole.*"

VI

TRAINING

During the Civil War the Navy could not have carried out its mission without the volunteer officers who entered it from the merchant service in large numbers. Fortunately this reserve was available but these officers had many limitations. The Navy suffered throughout the war from a shortage of trained seamen. Realizing both of these facts, Luce directed his efforts after the war to getting legislation for the establishment of Federal supported state nautical schools.

THE MANNING OF OUR NAVY AND MERCANTILE MARINE. *Proceedings*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 17-37 (1874). This is the first article printed in the U. S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, then called the *Record*. Luce first discusses the methods of enlisted training in the British and French navies. He then states: "*Our un-*

educated seaman will not stand a chance against the trained gunners of England and France." The article includes an explanation of the proposed bill to promote the efficiency of masters and mates in the merchant service and to encourage the establishment of public marine schools as they were then called.

UNITED STATES TRAINING SHIPS. *The United Service*, Vol. 1, pp. 425-43 (July, 1879). This article starts: "*Ici on parle Anglais.*" This notice so frequently seen in the shop windows of Paris was not long ago placarded in the starboard gangway of one of the ships of our Mediterranean Squadron. 'English spoken here!' The few American sailors who belonged to that ship had good reason to give such notice a conspicuous place. . . . The jest had at least the merit of a good point, and that point was a severe commentary on the character of the crews we have been for years employing to maintain the honor and integrity of the American flag on the ocean." To correct this condition a naval apprentice system was established. Luce gives a detailed description of the training of apprentices from whom are to be drawn the petty and warrant officers.

NAVAL TRAINING. *Proceedings*, Vol. 16, pp. 367-96 (1890). Luce, eleven years later, advocates that seamen for the new navy still be trained in sailing ships. A large group of officers disagreed with this theory and about this time the apprentices at Newport were transferred from the station ship to barracks ashore.

HOW SHALL WE MAN OUR SHIPS. *North American Review*, Vol. 112, pp. 64-9 (May, 1891). This article was written for the general public, which had lately become interested in the new and growing Navy. Luce repeats much of the material that he had in the first article in the *Proceedings*.

He gives his general formula for good enlisted personnel: (1) Get the boys young so they may be early inured to the rigors of sea life and know no other; (2) train them only in seagoing trades, particularly that of a seaman-gunner. He points out that the problem of manning national ships is twofold: (1) supplying trained seamen for the peacetime establishment; and (2) establishing a large reserve of seafaring people.

NAVAL TRAINING. *Proceedings*, Vol. 36, pp. 103-23 (Mar., 1910). This article gives Luce's reactions on what he believed was his single failure, the naval training system. He refers to his first article in the *Proceedings* in 1874 and points out how bad the personnel situation still was in the Navy of 1910. The Navy Department's recommended corrections for this condition were: (1) making the service more attractive; and (2) increasing penalties. Luce's recommendations were more basic to the problem. Youths should be naturalized to shipboard life during their formative years and they should be taught from the start that the ship is their home. He wanted apprentices to be from 14 to 17 years of age. Recruits of maturer age with fixed habits and social affiliations elsewhere can never adjust themselves to life on board ship. Did Luce have the answer for the personnel problem that is still plaguing all of the services today?

In conclusion, Luce's whole purpose in teaching and writing can be summed up in two quotations that he was fond of using:

"No past event has any intrinsic importance. The knowledge of it is valuable only as it leads us to form just calculations with respect to the future." Macaulay, *Essay on History* (1828).

"History is philosophy teaching by examples." Bolingbroke, *Letters on the Study of History* (1752).

ELIZABETHAN FIELD ARTILLERY¹

BY HENRY J. WEBB

I

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

ELIZABETHAN field artillery, like its modern counterpart, was a unit of the army which contributed to the action of the field forces through fire support. Its command was vested in a general officer called the Master of Artillery or, as was more frequently the case, the Master of Ordnance,² "one of the principall officers of the field,"³ whose duties and responsibilities went far beyond the command of field pieces. Not only was he in charge of all artillery, with mounts, carriages, ammunition, and the implements and material for making or repairing these, he was also in charge of a portion of the pioneers and, as a consequence, was sometimes responsible for preparing entrenchments, erecting fortifications, digging

mines and counter-mines, and constructing bridges over rivers and streams. Besides such powder and shot as would be needed for his own weapons, he had charge of munitions for the musketeers and arquebusiers. He was also a member of the commanding general's "counsell of warre."⁴

The organization of the ordnance master's command was in a state of flux during the Elizabethan period; but—theoretically, at least, if seldom in reality—he had under him a lieutenant with a staff of clerks, a master gunner,⁵ a gunner and a gunner's mate for each cannon in the unit, and a great number of artificers, such as wheelrights, carpenters, coopers, smiths, fletchers, masons, shipwrights, wagonwrights, and cable makers. Assigned to him by the high marshal on a more or less permanent basis was a band of pioneers under a captain,⁶ and one or more companies of soldiers to protect the pioneers, to guard the artillery, and to "see continually that the Gunners doe their duety."⁷ At-

¹Material for this paper was gathered with funds granted by the University of Utah Research Committee. The following libraries provided Dr. Webb with microfilm copies of the books herein discussed: British Museum, Folger Shakespeare Library, Library of Congress, Huntington Library, Newberry Library, and New York Public Library.

²Robert Barret also uses the title "Captain General of Artillery" in *The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Warres* (London, 1598), pp. 136-139.

³Thomas Digges, *An arithmeticall Militare Treatise* (London, 1590), p. 253; William Garrard, *The Art of Warre* (London, 1591), pp. 281-82. Digges, who was muster master general under Leicester in the Low Countries (see "An Elizabethan Combat Historian," *Military Affairs*, XIV, No. 2) and Garrard, who spent many years as a soldier in the Spanish Army, write the fullest contemporary accounts of the organization and equipment of 16th century artillery units.

⁴Barret, p. 139.

⁵Barret combines the offices of lieutenant and master gunner. After investigating Elizabeth's campaigns in Ireland, Cyril Falls states that the ordnance master's subordinate in Ireland was the master gunner. See *Elizabeth's Irish Wars* (London, 1950), p. 36.

⁶The captain is not mentioned by Digges.

⁷Garrard, *op.cit.*, p. 278. Garrard mentions three companies of soldiers. Digges merely says that there shall be "a sufficient Band for the Garde of the Artillery," p. 255. Barret enumerates 30 Gentlemen of the Artillery, 30 mounted arquebusiers, and 8 halberdiers as being in attendance upon the general, p. 132.

tached to him when the occasion warranted it, were other bands of pioneers, such as those under the command of the trench master, mine master, or fire (i.e., wild-fire) master.⁸

The lieutenant of artillery was the commander's principal assistant, whose duties combined those of a modern adjutant and an executive officer. He was to take charge of "inferiour matters," such as those pertaining to supplies or the training of gunners; and, since it was "neither possible nor convenient, that the Maister of Ordenaunce, should attend upon all the premisses himselfe," the lieutenant was also to have such other jobs delegated to him as did not come under the rather vague heading of "great and most important."⁹ Among these lesser jobs was that of disbursing munitions to infantry companies requiring them.¹⁰

The master gunner was to take charge of the gunners, principally looking to their "lyfe and behaviour."¹¹ The gunners themselves were not only to service their pieces but to make "Trunckes Balles, Arrowes, and all other sortes of wylde fyre and fyre worke."¹² The pioneers assigned to the artillery were to "make the wayes even and perfect" over which the cannon were to pass, "to plant Artillarie, and to entrench the place in the Campe . . . assigned for Munition."¹³

The unit to which these officers and men were assigned was a field army, roughly comparable in organization, though not in numbers, to a modern division. That is, it was the largest administrative and tactical force

placed in the field during the period, and it was composed of a varying number of infantry, cavalry, and pioneer companies grouped together as regiments. Unless placed in a fortress, smaller units than a field army apparently never had artillery attached to them.

The size of the artillery unit assigned to a field army depended upon the mission to be accomplished and the availability of cannon and cannoneers, neither of which were really plentiful in Elizabeth's reign. When the mission was to lay siege to a fortified city, as many cannon as possible were assembled; when, however, the mission was to engage the enemy in the field, very few cannon were required, since field tactics for artillery was in a most rudimentary stage during this period. Thus, to quote extremes, at one point in the siege of Ostend (1601), the Spanish, with approximately five or six regiments, managed to bring thirty-five pieces of ordnance to bear upon the city;¹⁴ while at the Battle of Nieuport in 1600—a field engagement pitting 13,800 English and Dutch and their allies against 12,000 Spanish—only twelve or fourteen cannon were brought into the field by both parties together.¹⁵

Something of the anomalous position of the general of artillery and his command can be seen in the organization of the English Expeditionary Force sent by Elizabeth to aid the Dutch in 1585. The "Head Officers of the field," appointed in late July of that year, included a Master of Ordnance. An exami-

⁸Barret, describing an ideal "army Royal," envisions additional personnel consisting of several more subordinate officers as well as two or three interpreters, a minister, a physician, a surgeon (with his servant), a trumpeter, and two or three engineers, pp. 132-33.

⁹Garrard, pp. 275, 278.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 275.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 274.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 275. The duties of the gunners and fire master here apparently overlap. The probability is that the fire master was a position seldom filled in sixteenth century English armies or that the fire master directed the gunners in the manufacture of fire works.

¹³Digges, p. 255.

¹⁴*The Oppugnation and Fierce Siege of Ostend* (London, 1601), sig.B^r.

¹⁵Contemporary accounts agree that the English had six pieces. *A True Relation of the Victorie Achieved by Count Maurice* (London, 1600) lists the Spanish as possessing "some Eight great pieces" (sig.A4^r), while Edward Grimestone in *A Generall Historie of the Netherlands* (London, 1608) says there were six Spanish pieces besides two more captured from the English at the beginning of the engagement, p. 1248. Barret's ideal "army Royal" would be equipped with 30 double cannon, 20 demi cannon, 20 culverins, and 15 demi culverins! See Barret, p. 134.

nation of the financial accounts of this force, however, reveals no mention of artillery or of gunners; but it does reveal that the Master of Ordnance had nominal command of an infantry company and that he and his company were transferred on 23 August from the field forces to the garrison of Ostend, where he assumed the governorship.¹⁶ If the field forces, which comprised approximately 8,000 men, had field artillery, it was not significant enough to be placed under separate command and listed in army financial accounts.

By 1590, these accounts begin to show evidence of expenditures on artillery, but the amounts are so slight as to be rather startling. Thus, of £442,059 paid out by Elizabeth between February 1587 and October 1590 for all purposes—wages and supplies—£1,558 were disbursed to artillery officers (ranks not designated) and £394 for ordnance.¹⁷ Of these small sums, how much was divided between fortified towns and the field forces is not stated. These figures, of course, do not give a true picture of the forces in field and garrison, for the Dutch were also supplying men, munition, victuals, and cannon to the combined armies. Nevertheless, it is obvious that, in spite of some significant advances in the development of ordnance in the sixteenth century,¹⁸ field artillery was one of the lesser components of the Elizabethan army.

II

EQUIPMENT

There was, in all probability, a wide gap between the number and kinds of equipment actually provided the field artillery and that ideally needed. It was absolutely necessary, of course, to have horses or oxen to draw the

cannon, and wagons to carry munitions. But how many horses, oxen, and wagons? Robert Barret felt that the greatest cannon should be pulled by twenty-four animals, the demi-cannon by eighteen, the culverin by twenty-four, the saker by twelve, and the falcon by eight—with greater numbers in foul weather;¹⁹ whereas Thomas Smith cut the number of animals down considerably and made a distinction between the drawing power of oxen and horses. Three yoke of oxen, Smith states in *The Arte of Gunnerie* (1600), "is thought to draw as much as three horses," and seventeen yoke of oxen can pull a cannon of 8,000 pounds, while three yoke can pull a 1,400 pound saker or a 900 pound falcon.²⁰ It was estimated that a "good cart, waine, or wagon," drawn by six or eight horses, could carry sixty cannon shot.²¹ Since a double cannon could fire about thirty times in every twenty-four hours and a falcon one hundred twenty times,²² some idea of the size of Elizabethan ammunition trains can be gained from this figure. Some cannon balls were of stone; other were of iron (called "whole iron shot" and "small base shot"). There were also chain shot, clive shot, and dice shot;²³ and gunners devised special shells, using "certaine little vesselles full of Nailes and Bullets chained together" and "little sacks full of Musket Bullets."²⁴

Wagons also carried a wealth of powder, chemicals, and tools. Barret's list of equipment includes

axeltrees, wheelles, ladles, sponges, rammers, iron crowes, leavers, shovells, mattocks, gabions, baskets, ropes, chaines, coyne . . . , powder

¹⁹Barret, p. 136.

²⁰Thomas Smith, *The Arte of Gunnerie* (London, 1600), p. 78.

²¹Barret, p. 136.

²²Cyprian Lucar, *A Treatise Named Lucar Appendix* (London, 1588), p. 48.

²³William Bourne, *The Arte of Shooting in Great Ordnance* (London, 1587), p. 61.

²⁴Edward Grimestone, *A True Historie of the Memorable Siege of Ostend* (London, 1604), pp. 37, 107, 193.

¹⁶*Manuscripts of Lord de L'Isle & Dudley* (Historical Manuscripts Commission), III, xxx-xxxvi.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. xxxv.

¹⁸For an account of the growing importance of artillery during the period, see Sir Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: E. P. Dutton, n.d.).

both serpentine and corne powder, cotton match, lintstockes, priming irons, their rules or instruments to take the levell, taladros that is, engines to mount and dismount the ordinance; shot of all sorts and sizes; cartages of all sizes, trunckes, arrowes, and balles of wild-fire and stuffe to make the same, . . .²⁵

The "stuff" to make fireworks, as assembled by Digges in his *Arithmetically Military Treatise* (1590), was comprised of "Sulphure, Saltpeter, Rosin, Calxvive, Lintseedeoyle, and common Lamp-oyle, Pitch, Tarre, Camphire, Wax, Tutia, Arsenick, Quick-silver, and Aqua vitae."²⁶

Since the Master of Ordnance had charge of conveying all troops over rivers, the field artillery was equipped with "boates made . . . with flat covers of square plancks, which chained together may make sodainly a Bridge to passe an Army over any water."²⁷

Finally, there was the artillery itself. In Elizabethan times at least eight different types of cannon were generally recognized: double-cannon, demi-cannon, quarter-cannon, culverin, saker, minion, falcon, and falconette; and the first four of these types were cast in several different sizes, each of which bore individual names.²⁸ The largest of these—the double-cannon—weighed approximately 8,000 pounds, had a bore 8¼ inches in diameter, was twelve feet long, and shot a ball of seventy pounds; the smallest—the falconette—weighed perhaps three hundred sixty pounds, had a bore 2¼ inches in diameter, was five or six feet long, and shot a ball of 1½ pounds.²⁹ These weapons were supplemented by mortars, instruments, as an early writer pointed out,

invented onely to annoy the enemy, when other Ordinance cannot be used against them, as being charged with stone shot to beate down the houses of the enemy or to fal amongst men being assembled together, or charged with balles

of wild-fire to burne the enemies ships, houses, or corne.³⁰

Some of these mortars were of tremendous size. At the siege of Grave, for instance, Maurice of Nassau had one—called a "great murderer" by a man who saw and described it—which shot "peeeces of blewe square stone, and other great stones out of it: of such bignes, that a man (with all his power & strength) is but able to lift one of them."³¹ But most of the mortars, it would seem, were commensurate with normal cannon, except for the shortness of the barrels.

Although Elizabethans were probably glad to get any kind of cannon they could lay their hands on without quibbling about where to use what size gun and when, they indicated that the ideal situation was one in which the largest weapons (the cannons) were available for wall pounding, the culverins for wall defense, and the smallest for use with troops in the field.³²

III

TACTICS

The tactics of Elizabethan artillery were extremely elementary, a fact due partly to the limitations of sixteenth century weapons and due partly to the lack of imagination of sixteenth century tacticians. Unlike modern artillery, Elizabethan artillery gave no depth to combat and was incapable of rapidly shifting its fire without changing its position. Its immobility is suggested by the general directions given for the emplacement of cannon in *The Arte of Warre*:

In the felde, when soever any day of service is, it is the office of the great Maister of the Ordenaunce, to select a convenient place to plant his Ordenaunce, as well to annoy the enemy, as also to be in such sort garded and

²⁵Barret, p. 137.

²⁶Digges, p. 254.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 255.

²⁸Lucar, p. 48.

²⁹Bourne, pp. 87-88.

³⁰Smith, pp. 87-88.

³¹*A True Discourse of all the Sallyes which the Soldiers of Grave Have Made* (London, 1602), p. 6.

³²See John Sheriffe's "The Brevie and the secret of the Art of great ordnance," as reproduced in A. R. Hall, *Ballistics in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, 1952), p. 166.

fortified, that it be not surprised of the enemy.³³

The normal position of artillery in the field was on one or both of the flanks almost on a line with or even in advance of the leading infantry and cavalry elements.³⁴ This position was sometimes varied by placing it directly in the front and center.³⁵ It could not fire over the heads of troops from the rear because of range limitations and the unpredictability of weapons and powder.³⁶ When on the flank it could maneuver, clumsily, forward and backward or to the right or left, and of course it could traverse in any direction. When directly in front it could move only to the right and left. But these maneuverings were obviously so slow (particularly if oxen were used to draw the cannon or if the target were beyond point blank range) that after the initial stages of combat, artillery was not especially effective as a supporting weapon in the offense. Machiavelli's interesting description of the role of artillery in the field, although penned in 1516 and, therefore, somewhat out of date in the Elizabethan period, nevertheless is an accurate description of the tactics often employed in the late sixteenth century.

Doe you not heare the artillerie? Ours have alredie shotte, but little hurte the enemy: and the extraordinary Veliti, issuing out of their places together with the light horsemen, moste speedely, and with moste merveilous furie, and greatest crye that maie be, thei assaulte the

enemy: whose artillerie hath discharges ones, and hath passed over the heddes of our footemen, without doing them any hurt, and because it cannot shoote the seconde tyme, the Veliti, and our horsemen, have nowe gotten it, and the enemies for to defende it are come forward, so that neither our ordinaunce, nor thenemies, can any more doe their office . . . the armie . . . with the men of armes on the sides, . . . marcheth in good order, to give the charge on the adversarie. See our artillerie, whiche to give them place, and to leave them the space free, is retired by the same space, from whens the Veniti issued: . . .³⁷

Noteworthy in this account is the fact that the artillery is described as being of small use for two reasons. Not only is it inaccurate—the cannon balls pass over the troops “without doying them any hurt”—it is also extremely vulnerable to attacks by the light-armed infantry and light horsemen, being overrun before it can “shoote the seconde tyme.”

In defence in the field, when elaborate, semi-permanent fortifications were thrown up, the artillery was naturally more useful. Planted in protected positions and bolstered by gabions, it covered routes of approach and could fire, as if from a fort, as long as sorties did not mask enemy troops, or as long as it managed to withstand assaults by opposing cavalry.

Against fortifications, Elizabethan field artillery was most successful. When pounding walls from prepared positions, neither the problem of maneuverability nor that of hitting friendly troops became important. Speed and accuracy of fire and effectiveness of impact were the paramount considerations. Speed and accuracy, of course, were governed by the development of Elizabethan science of gunnery, by the care with which cannon were

³³Garrard, p. 281.

³⁴Digges, pp. 345ff.

³⁵Garrard, p. 193.

³⁶There are various Elizabethan range tables extant, indicating that the effective range of Elizabethan artillery differed widely with the size of the cannon, the excellence of its construction, and the type of powder employed. Bourne mentions point blank ranges of 26, 40, and 80 yards, and a maximum range of “almost a mile,” *Arte of Shooting*, pp. 36-37. Thomas Smith notes a range of 700 yards, but he mentions the maximum range for wall-pounding to be 240 paces, *The Arte of Gunnerie*, pp. 51, 67-68. John Sherliffe, writing about 1590, indicates that the greatest point blank range of the farthest shooting cannon was 400 paces. At the same time, he notes that such cannon “be most serviceable for battery being within 80 paces of their mark.” See Hall, p. 166.

³⁷Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Arte of Warre* (London, 1560-62), fol. xlvij. The Veliti or velites, which were light infantrymen, would have been armed with bows in Machiavelli's day. By the end of the Elizabethan period, the bow was supplanted by the caliver, arquebuse, and musket.

cast, disparts and rear sights constructed, and powder manufactured, and by the extent of training and practice during the period, all of which has been discussed elsewhere.³⁸ Effectiveness of impact, however, was partly determined by gun emplacement, an aspect of tactics.

There were three ways of pounding walls. The master of ordnance could mount his cannon as close to the walls as possible and let his gunners fire at will. This indiscriminate sort of bombardment, however, was not approved in the latter part of Elizabeth's reign by those who theorized about or experimented with cannon. Two other methods of opening breaches in walls were advocated instead. William Bourne, for instance, advised gunners to set up two batteries of three guns each and have the No. 1 guns in both batteries shoot at the bottom of the mark, the No. 2's one foot higher, and the No. 3's one foot higher still—all at once.³⁹ Thomas

Smith, on the other hand, suggested that gunners plant their cannon in three positions, each approximately the same distance from the target, and aim their weapons in such a manner that the two side mounts would cut out that portion of the wall which the middle mount would batter.⁴⁰

Unfortunately, Elizabethans have not left any information about the methods of battering walls which they used in particular instances, and so the extent to which these tactics were put to use during the period cannot be determined. It might be pointed out, however, that in the fifteen-nineties, Maurice of Nassau—whose troops comprised both English and Dutch soldiers—was becoming almost spectacularly successful in reducing enemy fortifications. Some of his success, of course, was due to other aspects of siege-craft (such as undermining walls and starving garrisons), but cannonading also played its part. One may surmise that improved gun-mounting and battering tactics as well as superior weapons contributed to Maurice's victories.

³⁸Complete discussions of the impact of Tartaglia on ballistics of the sixteenth and subsequent centuries may be found in Charbonnier's *Essais sur l'Histoire de la Balistique* (Paris, 1928). Hall, *op.cit.*, considers certain aspects of the manufacture of artillery and of the gunner and his art. The present author in "The Science of Gunnery in Elizabethan England," *ISIS* (March 1954).

³⁹Bourne, p. 65.

⁴⁰Smith, pp. 67-69.

HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE ADDENDA

As we go to press the following most recent news flashes were received by the editor:

● Mrs. Francis Newcomb Armstrong, wife of Brig. General Donald Armstrong, USA, Ret., died at Walter Reed Hospital 6 December 1955. All officers and members of the American Military Institute, especially those who have the privilege of personally knowing General Armstrong, will wish to extend to him their heartfelt sympathy. The General is one of the outstanding pillars of the Institute. He twice served as president and currently is a member of the Board of Trustees.

● Colonel Samuel Engle Burr, Jr., President General of the Aaron Burr Association, announces that the sometime vice-president of the United States and officer of the Continental Army will be commemorated at a banquet and annual meeting of the Association at Fraunces Tavern (where Washington gave his Farewell Address), corner of Broad and Pearl Streets, New York City, 6 February 1956. Interested AMI members are invited, Colonel Burr's address: 6400 Dahlonga Road, Washington 16, D. C.

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

A CONNECTICUT YANKEE AT FREDERICKSBURG

BY RICHARD LOWITT

AMONG the voluminous types of material available about the Civil War—Official Records, diaries, press dispatches, regimental histories, memoirs, reminiscences, and letters—correspondence from enlisted men describing their experiences shortly after they occurred are perhaps the hardest to come upon. For this reason the following item, part of a collection of Gallup Papers at Connecticut College, written by a twenty-nine year old farmer's son from Ledyard, Connecticut is of value, as it depicts an enlisted man's view of one of the bloodiest battles of the entire war.

Francis E. Gallup, a private in the Twenty-First Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, wrote this letter to his brother, Joseph Albert Gallup, four days after the battle of Fredericksburg, the Regiment's first battle and Private Gallup's only combat service. Shortly after this letter was written, he came down with typhoid fever and was discharged in February 1863, just as his regiment was departing from its camp opposite Fredericksburg for Fortress Monroe and further service in the Army of the Potomac.

Opposite Fredericksburg, Va.

Dec.[ember] 17, 1862

Dear Brother Joe,

Received your letter yesterday and was very glad to get it and also a Norwich Courier. The mittens that were sent from home I received in due time and they were

just the thing, a perfect fit and have done me much good for we have pretty cold weather, nearly as cold as at home I should judge. We have just made a *grand retreat* from *Fredericksburg* as you have probably seen by the papers. We occupied Fred. [ericksburg] last Friday had a desperate fight Sat. [urday] lay still in the city Sun. [day] and evacuated Mon. [day] night. Estimated loss of our army twenty thousand, of the rebs one hundred men.¹ The rebels were strongly fortified by nature and art [illery] on a hill² about half a mile west of the city and all we had to do was to throw our men forward up that steep muddy hill side and when they got in the right position the rebs would pour the grape & canister down upon us in torrents while they were entirely sheltered by their earth works, rifle pits, etc. We had men enough and they fought well enough, but it was just impossible for infantry to storm those forts at the point of the bayonet and that was the only means we had to take them. Such a beautiful programme was followed up all day Saturday. Regiment after reg [iment] was ordered up and we stood all day in the street expecting every moment that the 21st would be ordered in, but thank fortune we were not till sundown then we went to

¹Union Casualties were over 12,000 killed, wounded and missing. Confederate losses were just less than half this number.

²Marye's Heights.

support another reg [iment],³ and when they got through firing and it was time for us to go up it was dark, so we lay still on the ground all night with bullets flying over our heads thick as hail but we lay close and had but few men wounded and none killed. Next morning we expected to go in of course, but instead of that we were marched back into the city where [we] lay all day Sun. [day] and Mon. [day] night we evacuated and came back [to] this side of the river. The boys call the place over where the fighting was done the "*Slaughter Field*." Many members of the old regiments who have been in nearly all of the battles say this was [the] hardest fighting they ever saw. . . . We have very little protection against this cold weather and the boys of our regiment are getting used up fast. Two deaths a day has been about the average in our reg. [iment] for some time past and the sick list is constantly lengthening. If we have no better care for the remaining part of the winter there will not be 1/3 of our reg. [iment] fit for service if we should have no fighting to do. It is perfectly awful to see men used up so and no good whatever accomplished.

There has been no deaths in our company⁴ yet but there are quite a number of sick. Our diet is principally [sic] raw pork & hard bread. Once in a while we have beans or rice and coffee and last week I had two potatoes. Haven't tasted soft bread for nearly two

months, but should be willing to if I had an opportunity. But this [is] a great and glorious country and *soldiering* is a big thing. I hope this war will be ended *soon* and in my opinion if it is not ended soon, it never will be by fighting.

James' wife wants one of my photographs so please send her one if you have not. The others after giving Edwin, Rufus, James, Nelson, Sarah etc. one each you may do what you please with.⁵ Am glad you like your situation at Packertown.⁶ Hope you will increase the musical power on meeting house hill⁷ this winter. Give my love to all the folks. Write often and I will try and write as often as I can. The \$50 Groton bounty you may do as you please with, but perhaps it won't pay to sue for it. Should like to take a turn round among you and see you all. Hope I may have the opportunity to do so before many months. I am through with Provost duty now, another company having taken that place but good night. Write soon and often and oblige your bro. [ther]

FRAN

³The Fourth Rhode Island. W. A. Croffut and John M. Morris, *The Military and Civil History of Connecticut during the War of 1861-65* (New York, 1868) p. 294.

⁴Private Gallup was a member of Company C comprised largely of men from Groton, Connecticut.

⁵Brothers and sister of Francis E. Gallup.

⁶Probably Packersville, a village in nearby Windham County where Daniel F. Packer was operating one of his numerous soap factories.

⁷The Congregational Church of Ledyard is located here.

DEDICATION OF THE SIGNAL CORPS MUSEUM

BY HELEN C. PHILLIPS

On 31 May 1955, the Signal Corps, United States Army, dedicated its museum in honor of the late Major Edwin H. Armstrong, pioneer in the development of radio communications, who at the time of his death in 1954 was Professor of Electrical Engineer-

ing at Columbia University, where in 1934 he succeeded his former teacher the great Michael I. Pupin. At the brief, impressive ceremony in front of the building, Lt. Colonel Christopher E. O'Hara, Post Chaplain, gave the invocation; Major General Victor A. Conrad,

Commanding General, Fort Monmouth, the welcoming address; and Major General James D. O'Connell, Chief Signal Officer, the dedicatory address. Mr. Harry Houck of Measurements Corporation, Boonton, New Jersey, past-president of the Radio Club of America and a close friend of Major Armstrong's since their World War I days at the Signal Corps Laboratory in Paris, unveiled the memorial plaque. Others present were Mr. Samuel C. Myer, great grandson of Brigadier General Albert J. Myer, founder of the Signal Corps; Major General J. O. Mauborgne (Retired); Major General George L. Van Deusen (Retired); and Major General Roger B. Colton (Retired).

At the "Home of the Signal Corps," Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, the Signal Corps is developing an unusual collection of military communications items, especially documents and equipment pertaining to the Corps. From a small collection assembled by World War I veterans, first displayed in the late 1930's, the collection grew to include memorabilia from the Civil War, the Spanish American War, both World Wars, and the Korean conflict.

There are notable historic flags beginning with the various cotton wig-wag models designed and used by General Myer; the Spanish flag Sergeant George S. Gibbs (later Major General and Chief Signal Officer) took down from the wall of Manila after he signaled the cease fire to Dewey at the Battle of Manila Bay; and the guidon of Company A commanded in World War I by Brigadier General Billy Mitchell who reputedly purchased this guidon from his personal funds while in France.

Uniforms include the accoutrement General Myer used during the Civil War and his later years as Chief Signal Officer; blue wool uniforms of the usual type worn in the

Spanish-American War, embellished with brass buttons bearing crossed flags and a torch and the out-size chevrons of the day with hand-embroidered Signal Corps insignia on both sleeves; canvas stable dress with trimmings and facings of Signal Corps orange; and canvas gloves, leggings, and a knapsack bearing the crossed flags and torch insignia.

Among the communications equipment there are a Beardslee magneto telegraph of the Civil War period; a piece of the first Atlantic cable, 1858; a heliograph; compasses; apparatus of the Wheatstone automatic telegraph system; field telephones used in the Spanish American War, the EE3, EE4, EE5, and the EE63; the 20-strap office switchboard, early radios and radio tubes including the hand-made de Forest audion; Armstrong's first regenerative amplifier and first super-heterodyne receiver; and meteorologic devices including the meteorograph, radio-sonde, and theodolite. In all these groups of signal communication equipment there are particular models of unusual historical significance, having been associated with some celebrated individual in military service, here or abroad, or perhaps with a President of the United States.

The museum serves a dual purpose. It is a part of the training program for recruits, orienting them in the historical development of today's communications. It is also a favorite center for visitors, military and civilian, American and foreign.

This memorial to American military communications with its nucleus in the collection of documents and memorabilia of late Brigadier General Albert J. Myer, founder of the Signal Corps, is a modest beginning. The Signal Corps is safeguarding these treasures until such time as Congress might provide funds to establish a more suitable repository.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services. THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: PLANNING MUNITIONS FOR WAR. By Constance McLaughlin Greene, Harry C. Thomson and Peter C. Roots. Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955. 542 pages including index; Illustrated; \$4.25.

To win battles the fighting man needs mobility and fire power for offensive action and protective devices to increase his chances for survival. These three elements of warfare are carefully and intelligently analyzed in this first of a three-volume history of the Ordnance Department in World War II. This volume is one of the most important in the series of the U. S. Army in World War II because so many elements of American life must combine all their resources and knowledge to give the American soldier superiority in the three requirements for success in war. If we listen to history more carefully, it might repeat itself less often. This particular volume should be attentively heeded and it should have the widest possible audience. It describes the mistakes that might be fatal if they occurred again, and it does so objectively and honestly.

Who are responsible for the sins of commission and omission that endanger the security of our country in these Ordnance matters? Note that the verb is plural, and for a good reason. No one can read far in this book before he becomes aware that the responsibility is shared by a number of groups besides the Ordnance. The reader soon perceives that the potential of the Ordnance in research and development is limited by appro-

priations from Congress. Infantry, Artillery and Armor establish the tactical requirements of weapons, and history shows their judgment has not always been entirely sound. Our country's engineering skill and ability to produce are limiting factors that necessitate compromises between what is wanted and what can be manufactured and effectively used on the battlefield. The Ordnance itself has much to learn from the record in this book which is based on the belief that old and bitter controversies should be laid to rest for the good of the country and the lessons of these controversies should teach us a better course for the future.

The competent historians who wrote this prologue to the production of munitions give us the facts and permit us to draw conclusions. They wisely introduce the subject with an excellent condensation of Ordnance history which shows the structure and methods of the Department as they developed prior to 1940. Organization and the selection and training of civilian and military personnel during the late war are adequately examined. These preliminary steps in the munitions program are followed by a study of research and development whose importance is emphasized without exaggeration. The specific case histories of small arms and artillery, trucks and tanks, and all other Ordnance materiel offer the reader a wealth of information that is readily comprehensible to the intelligent layman. This history can be recommended as of the utmost value for guiding us to a more effective solution of these basic problems in national security.

DONALD ARMSTRONG
Brig. Gen., USA, Rtd.
Washington, D. C.

Sea Devils. By J. Valerio Borghese. Henry Regnery, Chicago: 1954. Pp. 262, \$4.50.)

The substantial successes and the more numerous "glorious failures" of the Italian Navy's use of two-man torpedoes is well told in this highly interesting book by the officer who commanded the project during its more successful phase. This book is, in the reviewer's opinion, the best of the accounts of the stealthy underwater warriors who rode the two-man torpedoes in World War II.

The development and use of this "secret weapon" from its genesis in 1918—when two young Italian naval officers developed a two-man torpedo and on the 31st of October 1918 entered Pola harbor and sank the *Viribus Unitis*—until it actually gained command of the sea in the Mediterranean in 1941, progresses in an interesting and, at times, dramatic account from the facile pen of the author. Basically, the two-man torpedo, carrying two men in tandem, equipped with underwater breathing gear, could navigate their craft underwater to depths up to 60 feet for several miles at speeds of about 3 knots. The detachable time fuzed war head could then be fixed to the hull of the target, the remainder of the "torpedo" sunk, and the two man crew could then attempt a hazardous escape shoreward.

Behind the months of heart-breaking effort in developing successful "torpedoes" and in training the intrepid crews to man them, was the glittering prize of British warships based at Gibraltar, Suda, Malta and Alexandria. That this prize was won, after repeated failures, is attested by the December 1941 sinking, in Alexandria harbor, of the only two British capital ships then remaining in the Mediterranean: the battleships *Valiant* and *Queen Elizabeth*. A short while before, German U-Boats had sunk the carrier *Ark Royal* and the battleship *Barham*. This master stroke, carried out by three "torpedoes," shifted control of the sea to the Italian fleet of four modern battleships. Why this advantage was not quickly exploited remains a naval mystery.

The individual heroism of the 6 men who participated in the Alexandria attack was applauded by friend and foe alike. After the war had brought about release of prisoners, the heroic two-man team which sank the *Valiant* had their Italian gold medals for gallantry in war pinned on by none other than the former commanding officer of the *Valiant*, Admiral Morgan, R.N., the Chief of the Allied Naval Mission!

The sinking of the two British battleships

brought prompt and generally effective protective measures; never again could such a rich haul be gathered.

The technique of underwater attacks using two-man torpedoes and one man limpet mine carriers, discovered, developed and heroically employed by the Italians, paid off in greater tonnage per man employed than any other naval venture, either Axis or Allied. The score: warships tonnage, 75,690; merchant ship tonnage, 189,662.

SAMUEL G. KELLY
Captain, USN (Rtd.)
Washington, D. C.

Le Réarmement Clandestine du Reich 1930-1935, by Georges Castellan, Vu par le 2^e Bureau de l'Etat—Major Français. Preface par le General Weygand. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1954. Pp. 565. 1650 francs.)

This important volume is written by a French military historian who has previously contributed articles in this area and is the author of *Histoire de l'armée* and the chapter "Reichswehr et L'armée rouge," in *Lés Relations germanosovietique, 1933-1939*. It is a scholarly, well-documented study based on an extensive use of the French Military Intelligence records of the years 1930-1935 and from the point of view of how this most important bureau of the French General Staff saw the development of the illegal rearmament of the enemy.

Carefully indexed, half of the volume is concerned with the administrative history of the growth of the Reichswehr, the Reichsheer, Aviation, and the technical collaboration of the Reichswehr and the Red Army.

The second part describes the economic and political mobilization paralleling the armed forces growth and concludes with a discussion of the strategy of the Reichswehr and French reaction to these events.

This most significant volume should be made more available by being translated into English as it is a must book for any scholar concerned with this period of history. It is an excellent representative of the many important volumes in French whose existence are not widely known to English readers.

GEORGE J. STANSFIELD
Reference Librarian
National War College
Washington, D. C.

United States Naval Chronology, World War II, compiled in the Naval History Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. Foreword by Admiral D. B. Duncan, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. (Washington: U. S. G. P. O., 1955. Pp. 214, indexed. \$1.75)

United States Naval Chronology, World War II, presents in a handy-sized volume the chronological outline of all major and most minor events of the United States naval activities of World War II. It lacks completeness only in that no reference is made of the destruction of the enemy's merchant fleet by submarines, aircraft, and mines.

A most remarkable feature of the book is its readability. Ordinarily one would expect such a volume to fairly creak with dry fact; but not so, rather quite the contrary is the case. One reads with amazement for example the terrific impact of events occurring in June 1944, a month that was unquestionably the most active of the whole war as all naval fronts were intensely engaged.

One can hardly lay down this book as events roll on through page after page. The reader will find himself coming back to refresh his mind on the great and relentless panorama that finally sets the stage for the inevitable collapse of the Axis.

Historians will find this a ready reference tool of great value in their work. Indeed, anyone who likes to recall events of this, the greatest of all wars, will find that it brings to mind a multitude of near-forgotten incidents and events which refresh the well-springs of good reminiscence.

So excellent a contribution to the chronological outline of events of World War II deserves a companion volume to complete the naval picture. The reviewer trusts that Rear Admiral John B. Heffernan, USN (Ret.), Director of Naval History, has under preparation a second volume of Naval Chronology which will cover the blockade operations in the Pacific in which United States submarines played so magnificent, vital, but generally unrecognized, role.

CAPTAIN B. J. HARRAL, USN
Head, Dept. of English, History
and Government
U. S. Naval Academy

The Lost Account of the Battle of Corinth and the Court Martial of Gen. Van Dorn, by an Unknown Author and edited by Monroe F. Cockrell. (Jackson, Tenn.: McCowat-Mercer Press, Inc., 1955. Pp. 78 x. \$1.50, leatherette paper. Edition limited to 1750.)

The particular virtue of this little volume is the reprinting of an account of the battle of Corinth uncovered by Mr. Cockrell, the editor, and reported by him to be the only known copy in existence. A large battle-map compiled by Mr. Cockrell in his studies of the battle of Corinth is quite helpful in understanding the account. The book includes reproductions of applicable photographs from Miller's *Photographic History of the Civil War*.

A summary of the court-martial of General Van Dorn by the editor (4 pages) is included. This is not well done and could have been more effective in a narrative review rather than a condensation of individual testimony. "Capt. E. H. Cummings" should be "Cummins," and "Capt. Tobin" should be "Lt. Tobin." More serious is giving a specification of one of the charges by Bowen against Van Dorn as "Refusing services of artillery officer and not reconnoitering" when it should read "Refusing services of engineer officer, etc." (Page 43 and under Van Dorn's picture following "Editor's Introduction." See *Official Records*, Vol. 17, pt. 1, p. 415.)

The "complete roster" of Confederate forces in the battle of Corinth omits Lt. Hogg's Appeal (Ark.) Battery in Cabell's brigade.

The Confederate losses contain several errors in numbers as well as omitting completely the losses of Cabell's and Phifer's brigades.

The editor is evidently impressed with the legend of great slaughter before Battery Robinette at Corinth, yet the total killed in two days in the 2d, 6th, and 9th Texas, and the 35th Mississippi totaled only 101, making the statement in the *Military and Naval History of the Rebellion*, p. 294, that 56 dead were before Battery Robinette seem reasonable.

This reviewer is forced to the conclusion that the editing here is detrimental to the lost account; it would have been better had it been printed without comment. The book is below standard for the McCowat-Mercer Press because of the weakness of the added material. Mechanically it is colorful, attractive, and of good quality.

ROBERT W. DONNELLY
Civil War Round Table

Delaware's Role in World War II, 1940-1946. By William H. Conner and Leon deValinger, Jr. (Dover, Delaware: Public Archives Commission, 1955. Two volumes. Vol. I, Pp. 356; Vol. II, Pp. 250. Illus. \$6.00 the set.)

At the beginning of World War II the Public Archives Commission of Delaware realized the necessity for collecting data on the participation of Delaware and her citizens in the war effort. Appeals for help from volunteers were made; the responses were generous and long-lasting. The present volumes are largely a result of the painstaking labors of these many volunteers who contributed thousands of hours of time in cutting Delaware items from newspapers and mounting them on cards for alphabetical filing. Valuable information was also gained by the cooperation of the Department of Delaware, American Legion, which established a war history committee in each post in the state. In addition, as the war neared its end Governor Walter W. Bacon helped the Public Archives Commission obtain permission from Selective Service to make copies of the separation forms of all Delawareans discharged from the armed services. Final credit, of course, for the completion of these books must be given to the indefatigable industry of Leon deValinger, Jr., State Archivist, in directing the work, and to the skill of William H. Conner in preparing the narrative.

After discussion of the preparation for war and the induction of the first Delaware troops in September 1940, volume I describes the military activity of Delawareans in the Pacific; in China, Burma, and India; in the Aleutians; in North Africa and in the Mediterranean, as well as in France and Germany. Volume II continues the history with the experiences of Delaware's fighting forces in England, in Japan, and in the American Theatre of operations. Enough of the general background of each theatre of war is provided in each case so that individual deeds do not seem like isolated incidents. There is an interesting chapter on distinguished Delawareans, including Delaware's two Congressional Medal of Honor winners.

Carefully interwoven in the narrative is the story of the part Delaware's civilians played in winning the war, in civilian defense, industry, and agriculture.

Each of these volumes has a well prepared index of persons and places mentioned. Volume I has three useful appendixes: one a list of honored dead; the second the roster of the 198th Coast Artillery (AA) Regiment; and the third, the roster of the 261st Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) Battalion. The books are profusely illustrated.

Delawareans themselves—and those who admire the First State for its solid achievements through hard work—may well be pleased to have these books. Congratulations to Archivist deValinger and to Journalist Conner.

DOROTHY D. GONDOS
The American University
Washington, D. C.

General Jo Shelby Undeclared Rebel, by Daniel O'Flaherty. (Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954. Pp. 437. \$6.00.)

This is a biography of Major General Joseph Orville Shelby, C.S.A., who made a reputation in the fighting in Arkansas and Missouri. The author, who frankly admits he is neither a military expert nor a scholar, has none the less produced an interesting and readable life story of a long neglected Confederate general.

Actually the war only takes about 190 pages of this book, with Shelby's post-war activities, particularly his Mexican adventures, mining and railroad ventures, Reconstruction politics, and the trial of Frank James taking the remainder. The author has succeeded in portraying a man and his character epitomized by Shelby's statement at Austin, Texas, in 1865 when he refused Confederate gold for his troops: "We are the last of our race. Let us be the best as well."

Considerable efforts have apparently been made in research for new material. Mr. O'Flaherty has done quite a job in untangling the details of these trans-Mississippi campaigns and engagements which are still largely ignored by historians, and it is too bad that a few well-chosen maps were not included in the text. Only one of Shelby's raid of October, 1863, is included. More maps would have aided the reader considerably in understanding these campaigns and engagements. Twenty pages of notes and a fifteen page index are valuable additions to the book.

RALPH W. DONNELLY
Civil War Round Table
Washington, D. C.

The Campaign for the Sugar Islands: A Study of Amphibious Warfare. By Marshall Smelser. (Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1955. Pp. 212. \$5.00)

In a sense, Professor Smelser's book receives a false start from the foreword penned by Samuel Eliot Morison. The operation to capture Guadeloupe in Britain's year of victory, 1759, was not "the most successful amphibious landing in history, between King Agememnon's at Troy and General Eisenhower's in Normandy," not even when qualified by the word "perhaps." Nor could the campaign properly be termed "one of the gayest [reviewer's italics] and most gallant operations of a war which brought England glory, territory—and a colonial revolution."

One of the volumes in the Institute of Early American History and Culture's series, jointly sponsored by Colonial Williamsburg and The College of William and Mary, the book is a sprightly case study of 18th Century amphibious warfare in the West Indies. Smelser's extensive research into primary British and French sources has managed to give life to a campaign that is usually written off by latter-day historians in a few odd lines or paragraphs. In its day Guadeloupe was more valuable a commercial prize than Canada and its capture ranked with the seizure of Louisburg and Quebec, at least in London's counting houses. So in contemporary measure, the expedition against the Sugar Islands ranked with the most important operations of the French and Indian War.

Personality study is the keynote of the author's narrative of the expedition. Through the abortive attempt against Martinique and the successful, though debilitating, campaign on Guadeloupe, the British commanders and to a lesser extent the French principals acquire solid characters with the reader. In this point of style the author's careful personality hypotheses, drawn from available records, follow the system of many of the most respected military and naval historians.

The story features graphic description of the details of the Anglo-French military operations and Smelser exhibits a fine appreciation of the difficulties of naval support and action in the days of sail. He has highlighted the real enemy in this expedition and the many others of its type in a century of conflict in the West Indies, the morbid climate which turned the campaign on Guadeloupe into a race with the sick returns.

Even General Barrington's brilliant tactical successes seem insignificant in comparison to the pervading spectre of death by tropical disease.

The book's primary shortcoming as a military history is its lack of large scale maps to accompany its extensive mention of place names and terrain information. There are only two general maps where a dozen could easily be used. As a personal note, the reviewer felt that the author had a much better grasp and feeling for contemporary naval organization and tactics than he did for comparable subjects for the land forces.

The easy literary style of the book is for the most part commendable, although a tendency to use hackneyed phrases like "butcher bill" for casualty lists and a strained overreaching for colorful language will irritate some readers. In a book of this type, written for a special and supposedly knowledgeable audience, the extensive footnoting from secondary sources which marks the pages on a historical background is superfluous. Taken altogether, however, *The Campaign for the Sugar Islands, 1759* is a worthy addition to Early American History and Culture series as the precursor of what we may hope will be a number of similar careful military histories of our early Colonial period.

HENRY I. SHAW, JR.
Historical Branch, G-3
Headquarters, U. S. M. C.

The Crecy War, by Lt. Col. Alfred H. Burne. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1955. Pp. 366. \$7.00.)

Col. Burne's eminence as a military historian has long been established, and in one of his many works on the art of war, *The Battlefields of England*, he displayed his ability to dig into the scanty sources for medieval warfare and to come up with first-rate narratives of campaigns and battles. In *The Crecy War* this singular ability is demonstrated in an even more convincing manner. The book is a military history of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny in 1360. In this short period of time, however, Crecy and Poitiers were fought and won by the English. Not until 1415 would the great victory at Agincourt take place.

In the campaigns of Edward III English "militarism" reached its zenith. Burne, like Fortescue, makes no attempts to disguise the fact that at the time of the "Crecy War" the military spirit was very strong in England, as the naval spirit was

to be strong in Elizabethan days and after. Edward, himself a most capable general, had a superb military machine under his command. It was by far the best army in Europe, and like Wellington's men, "could go anywhere and do anything." Also Edward III was blessed with outstanding subordinates, such as the Black Prince, Sir John Chandos, Henry of Lancaster and Walter Manny.

The descriptions of battles such as Crecy and Poitiers are clear and concise. Burne's account of Crecy is a shade better than that of Oman, and his handling of a very complicated battle, Poitiers, surpasses that of Belloc, though it does not go into quite so much detail. The author takes the stand, and backs his stand, with documentary evidence plus what he calls "Inherent Military Probability," that cannon were used at Crecy. This has been a much debated point. All disputants seem to agree, however, that if artillery was used, it did little damage and had no influence on the outcome of the battle.

English tactics of long bow and mounted and dismounted men at arms, used so successfully at Halidon Hill in 1333, made the Crecy War important in military history, as they marked the end of the long supremacy of feudal cavalry.

The Crecy War is a book that cannot be ignored by anyone interested in military history in general, and the evolution of the art of war in particular.

ROBERT WALKER DAVIS
Washington, D. C.

The Study of International Relations. By Quincy Wright. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955. Pp. 584. Index and Appendix. \$6.00)

"International relations," writes Professor Wright, "is today a discipline in the process of formation." This current work represents the author's efforts to aid the student in understanding not only the process but also the discipline and it continues to some extent the analysis of the disciplines relevant to international relations set forth in his earlier *Study of War* (1942).

This is definitely a scholarly if somewhat laborious work and will never be a popular text book among undergraduate students because of its detailed, precise and profoundly technical style and approach. For the graduate student and specialist in the field it should prove invaluable. While it may never rank as highly as *Study of War* it

has every claim to that position. It can be strongly recommended for use in advanced courses in International Relations.

JOHN E. KIEFFER
Lt. Col., USAF
Washington, D. C.

Hannibal of Carthage. By Mary Dolan. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. Pp. 308. \$3.75)

Alps and Elephants: Hannibal's March. By Gavin de Beer. (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955. Pp. 123. Index. 10s, 6d)

Few historical novels would emerge unscathed from the kind of test this one has just passed in triumph. The ordeal by verification with Polybius and Livy proves that Miss Dolan's scholarship is sound and she is equally successful in telling the story of Hannibal in a modern idiom. The former would have trouble in picking flaws in the historical facts of Hannibal's military exploits as Miss Dolan tells them. But they would undoubtedly react violently to the portrait she draws of Hannibal. Where they would have written of the contemptible treachery of Rome's most dangerous enemy, Miss Dolan sees only skillful strategems. Where they would record only exaggerated episodes to prove the ruthless cruelty of the Carthaginian general, Miss Dolan has described an entirely different character. Of course, this is natural since the two historians who wrote in Rome would be little inclined to discover any pleasing traits in a general who for fifteen years defeated Roman armies in Italy itself and made their military leaders ridiculous during those years.

Of all the generals of antiquity, Hannibal is undoubtedly the most useful for the modern soldier to know. He was a master of grand strategy, of purely military strategy, of stratagem and of tactics. For fifteen years with little or no support from Carthage, he seized and kept the initiative in his campaigns in Italy. Those few years can serve as a laboratory for observing the principles of strategy, for proving the value of the offensive and of surprise, for showing the significance of economy of force and security. Hannibal's art of war was the product of the intellect and his campaigns were thoughtfully conceived and carefully planned. His psychological insight was unusual and his leadership of a motley international force uniquely effective. Miss Dolan's novel brings out these aspects of Hannibal's mili-

tary genius and for the busy modern reader her book can serve as a fast moving and fascinating introduction to his extraordinary career.

Polybius refers contemptuously to the works of a certain Greek Sosylos who accompanied Hannibal on his campaigns and ranks his history "with the common gossip of a barber shop." We have no way of judging. The works of Sosylos have unfortunately not come down to us, but Polybius, the friend of Scipio, would have no kind words for a history friendly to Hannibal. Miss Dolan's deft device in this novel is the invention of this lost history. Sosylos tells his story which deals principally with Hannibal's long march from Spain over the Alps to Italy and his campaigns to include his momentous victory at Cannae. Her novel is one of a mere handful that merit some notice in a quarterly devoted to military history.

Hannibal marched to Italy in 218 B.C. Within a few decades his itinerary over the Alps became a subject of controversy and has continued so to this day. Miss Dolan is not concerned with the fine details of where Hannibal crossed the Rhone and the Alps, but how he did it. Another entertaining and scholarly book has just been published in England dealing with the minutiae of Hannibal's march. Possibly it is the definitive solution of the mystery. At all events it is as exciting a detective story as any of Sherlock Holmes and it makes most appropriate reading with Miss Dolan's novel.

Sir Gavin de Beer believes that he can support his theory of Hannibal's route "with definite evidence in some places, inferred evidence in others and high probability in the remainder." The variety of evidence is astonishing. Sir Gavin looks to Polybius and Livy for basic data, and his conclusions conform to the testimony of these two historians. Other important scraps of evidence have been found in the writings of the ancient geographers, astronomers and even in ancient poems and a farming manual. The most important clue to Hannibal's true itinerary, however, comes from a misinterpretation of the name of a river in the text of Polybius. Sir Gavin argues convincingly for his solution. It enables him to identify a certain geographical area from which the story of Hannibal's journey can be traced backwards and forward. Climate and the setting of the constellations, philology and the evidence of the actual topography are called on to justify the thesis of this book. Sir Gavin admits he may be wrong, but his hypothesis seems soundly established with an amazing array of data accumulated in many years of study which the author admits was a labor of love. A number of appendices, a selective bibliography, a list of references to classical authors quoted in the text, and a useful index provide ample scholarly apparatus for this new solution of an age-old problem.

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SHORT REVIEWS

Space has permitted brief mention of only a few of the volumes received for review from our cooperative publishers. Many other volumes will be considered in the next issue.

TUNIS, EDWIN: *Weapons*, a pictorial history. (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1954. Pp. 153. \$4.95)

With text and over 300 detailed drawings both by the well known artist, this volume provides for all those over twelve a most fascinating visual aid for anyone interested in military history. Weapons from stone age to the Hydrogen Bomb are carefully drawn and the brief popular text provides an introduction to the subject. It is not documented, however, nor is there a bibliography as in Foulkes' *Arms and Armaments* (Harrap, 1945), but the preface acknowledges the expert assistance given the author.

TUNIS, EDWIN: *Wheels*, a pictorial history. (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1955. Pp. 96. \$3.95)

Similarly designed for the general reader, few purely military vehicles are shown, but a better appreciation of the logistics problems provided by earlier transportation methods will be gained by this pleasing volume.

U. S. CONGRESS, 84TH, 1ST SESSION, SENATE:
Atoms For Peace Manual (Washington: U. S. GPO, 1955. Pp. 615. \$1.75)

A compilation of official materials on international cooperation for peaceful uses of atomic energy from President Eisenhower's "Atom Power for Peace" speech of December 1953 to July 18, 1955. It has an introduction by Senator Alexander Wiley who indicates U. S. peaceful aims, and it was edited by the Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Cahn.

EWING, WILLIAM S.: *Guide to the Manuscript Collections in the William L. Clements Library*. 2nd Ed. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Clements Library, 1953. Pp. 548 \$4.00)

Prepared by the curator of manuscripts, it describes a Library whose strength lies in its several integrated collections representing the British point of view in the period of the American Revolution, as well as of such American military leaders as General Greene. It is arranged alphabetically by the 304 collections which give a brief description of each one. About half the volume is an Index of names of authors. It is an invaluable guide of the student or American History.

GREAT BRITAIN, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: *Statement on Defence*, 1955. (London: H. M. SO; New York: British Information Services, 1955. Pl. 30. ls)

Command paper 9391 presented in February 1955 is the annual estimate for the future based on the previous years' events. Valuable for the historian interested in coalition warfare.

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES; Materials in the National Archives, relating to the Middle East. (Washington: U. S. GPO, 1955. Pp. 96, apply)

Reference information paper No. 44, May 1955, describes available materials under the subject headings: Government and politics, diplomatic relations, *Military Affairs*, geography, economic affairs and social conditions.

EMME, EUGENE: *Hitler's Blitzbomber* (Maxwell Air Force Base; Alabama: 1951. Pp. 44, apply)

These formerly classified historical notes on high command decisions influencing the tardy operational use of the ME-262 in German air-defense are one in the series of the valuable Air University Documentary Research Studies. It covers the strategic military-political decisions regarding these turbo-jet fighters whose earlier combat use might have changed the entire course of the air war in Europe and thus the entire war.

STACEY, COL. C. P., ed.: *Introduction to the Study of Military History*, for Canadian Students (Ottawa, Queens Printer, 1955. Pp. 152. 50¢)

This is the fourth edition, enlarged and further revised by Col. Stacey, director, of the Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottawa to include the end of the Korean War. A valuable inexpensive volume for all military historians.

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#Compiled by R. W. Davis and the Editor.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

GENERAL ANDERSON AT AMI LUNCHEON

The hypnotic effect of the concept of defense upon the military mind was decried by Major General Orvil A. Anderson, U.S.A.F., Ret., Executive Director of the Air Force Historical Foundation, before a luncheon meeting of over 75 members and guests of the American Military Institute at the Fort L. J. McNair Officers' Club, 19 October 1955.

General Anderson, speaking on the topic of "The Influence of History as a Guide to the Conduct of War," characterized the strategic concepts promoted in the British Admiralty budget justification of 1902 as sound today. This paper favored the principle of concentration of forces and avoided all reference to "defense" on the ground that the primary mission of the British Navy (and by inference, the American Air Force today) was to attack to maintain lines of communication and to destroy the enemy fleet, the ultimate end of its reason for existence. The speaker commented, "I wish we had a little more of that thinking in our current military problems."

Anderson reviewed the history of the development of the submarine as a weapons system, pointing out the reluctance of the military mind to accept technological changes and their strategic potentialities. He commented that while Hitler had the advantage of hind sight as to the use of submarines as a strategic weapon, Germany proceeded to build an orthodox sea force, setting aside only 1/7 of the naval budget for the undersea force. Japan, likewise, rated its submarines as only fifth in budget importance prior to World War II.

General Anderson, turning directly to American Air Power, pointed out that in the

first World War the strategic concept of observation prevailed as the rôle for airplanes, and America never built combat airplanes. In World War II, air superiority was finally achieved by means of improvisations, and America demonstrated its potential air power.

"The feature of an air weapons system is the prerogative of attack and withdrawal at will," declared the General, "although the reflections are not made manifest today in the military missions of the Air Force." Basically, the concept needed today is to win the battle for the command of the air while we still have something left to salvage.

General Anderson, branded by some as an advocate of preventive war, said he did not visualize war as the solution of political questions, but endorsed war only as a last resort. Calling for Americans to shed the shackles of delusion and adopt a realistic attitude, he laid down as a guiding principle the ability of delivering a crippling blow *first*, rather than as retaliation. He rejected as unsound the principles of co-existence or its alternative, co-extermination as offering a potential enemy the initiative of tactical surprise, such as the shedding of radius as a limitation of action, "atomic blackmail," and the induction of the dispersal of force.

General Anderson, then Captain Anderson, is a pioneer in American air exploration, having been on the famous stratosphere balloon flight with Captain Albert W. Stevens in *Explorer II* on November 11, 1935 that reached 72,395 feet (over 13½ miles) aloft.

The speaker was introduced by Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, U.S.A.F. Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, U.S.N., Ret., President of the A.M.I., presided.

CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE DOINGS

Francis Wilshin, a well-known member of the Washington CWRT and formerly National Park Service historian at the Fredericksburg Battlefield was recently promoted Superintendent of the Manassas National Military Park. Our heartiest congratulations to fellow member Wilshin! He is one of the most engaging and hardest workers as a War lecturer, raconteur, and battlefield guide.

The Washington CWRT swung into its 1955 fall program with customary zest, opening with a lecture on "Richmond in War Time," by Clifford Dowdy, delivered at the dinner meeting of 13 September 1955, at the Army and Navy Club. Kermit V. Sloan is the new chairman of the Program Committee. The annual fall field trip took place on 24 September, and under the expert guidance of Virgil (Pat) Jones, three bus loads of hardy fans braved an equinoctial downpour to travel through Mosby's Confederacy from Fairfax Courthouse to Front Royal and back to Washington. On 10 October, Dr. Otto Eisenschiml of the Chicago Round Table delivered a highly stimulating talk at the monthly dinner of the District of Columbia CWRT, entitled "An Unorthodox View of the Civil War. He had the hardihood to rate Lee and Grant below some other top flight soldiers of The War. The listening members had a masochistic time snorting and grinding their respective molars (if any). The lion-maned doctor has the temerity to move abroad without a bodyguard. In the interim, by direction of President Karl Betts, Colonel J. Gay Seabourne's committee revised the Constitution and by-laws of the District CWRT. It is published in the 1955-56 Year Book. At the December meeting, on the 13th, Captain Samuel G. Kelly, USN, delivered a lecture on "The Red River Expedition."

The Civil War Round Table movement keeps ever growing. A. E. Geldhof of the Chicago Round Table now lists the following seventeen Round Tables in existence: Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, Chicago, Detroit, Evansville, Ind., Houston, Lexington, Ky., Los Angeles, Mayville, N. Y., Milwaukee, New York City, North Carolina, Philadelphia, Richmond, St. Paul-Minneapolis, and Washington, D. C. The movement even gives signs of becoming international. A live-wire organization exists in Portsmouth, England, called "The Confederate Research Club." These good people are rehabilitating the neglected grave of James D. Bulloch, famed Confederate agent in Europe in the early 1860's.

WAR PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR

The Seminar on the Philosophy of War, jointly sponsored by St. John's College of Annapolis and the American Military Institute, opened its second year in the Washington area with a meeting on 3 November 1955. For the past four years this adult seminar has been held in Annapolis also. The Seminar is an attempted answer to the assertion of the famed historian Charles A. Beard that "No philosophy of war in its relation to diplomacy, world economy, national destiny or ideals of the good life has ever been formulated in the United States. . . ." In view of the world conditions of 1955, an examination will be made not only into the attitude of civilians toward war, but also into the question as to whether there is a philosophy of war common to the military in the United States, or whether there is a separate philosophy for each service. Anyone interested in the problems of peace and war is invited to join the discussions. In Washington the meetings are held in the Navy Department Building on Constitution Avenue, under the joint leadership of George J.

Stansfield, Reference Librarian, The National War College, and Lt. Colonel Franklin B. Nihart, USMC, Institute member. Further information regarding the Seminar may be obtained from Mr. Stansfield, 617 S. Washington St., Alexandria, Virginia.

CONGRATULATIONS TO GENERAL BEUKEMA

The vice president of the American Military Institute, Brigadier General Herman Beukema, USA, Ret., is currently the Director of the Overseas Program of the University of Maryland. This new departure in college level education is now several years old, and is conducted under the Dean of the College of Special and Continuation Studies of the University, with responsibility for its overseas operations delegated to General Beukema who is noted for his many years of successful teaching as professor of history and government at West Point. From his headquarters in Heidelberg, Dr. Beukema controls a faculty and staff of over two hundred persons functioning in fifteen countries where our armed forces are stationed—Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Turkey, Ethiopia, Libya, French Morocco, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Greenland, Iceland, Labrador, and Newfoundland. On 27 May 1955, the Overseas Program held its second annual commencement in Heidelberg, Germany, with General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, heading the guests of honor and making the principal commencement address.

In a letter to the Editor, dated 22 September 1955, received after our Fall 1955 issue went to press, General Beukema writes:

"I hope you fully enjoyed your visit to Germany. And I am sure you must have been impressed by both the speed and quality of the country's recovery. Here at any rate is a people who really like to work. We could use a bit of the same

spirit in other areas of the free world. . . . Thanks for the good word about my job. Like Topsy, it continues to grow. Of course the head-count measure of an educational operation is not a sound criterion in itself. But, for whatever it's worth, the total of first term enrollment in the current year is about double that of two years ago, this at a time when such things as major troop shifts, the temporary black-out of our work in French Morocco, and a one-term suspension of . . . classes in Saudi Arabia should have the figure down to 5000. Instead, it is above 7100. Our principal effort from now on will be the strengthening of soft spots in our curricula. Like every educational project I have ever studied, ours can stand improvement. . . . All good wishes for further success with the Journal. I enjoy it."

Yes, Professor Beukema, we were impressed with the German recovery, but we are particularly proud of the success of the Institute's vice president. Our best wishes to you for the coming year.

NECROLOGY*

GENERAL JOHN MCAULEY PALMER

Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer, holder of the Distinguished Service Medal, died in Washington, D. C. on 26 October 1955 at the age of 85. It was indeed fortunate that this distinguished soldier, who was on the original General Staff Corps eligible list, should have a career so long and active. Yet it is with a sense of deep loss that the Institute notes the passing of one of its former members.

General Palmer was born in Illinois on 23 April 1870, and spent a good part of his boyhood in Springfield, where he knew several persons who had known Abraham Lincoln. His grandfather, of the same name,

was distinguished politically by having been Governor of Illinois and United States Senator, militarily by having commanded a Union division at Chickamauga and Murfreesboro. Entering West Point in June 1888, young Palmer was commissioned second lieutenant of infantry four years later, and by the beginning of the Spanish-American War had reached the rank of first lieutenant. His steps up the promotion ladder were regular and fairly rapid, considering the very slow advancement of that period; by the time the U. S. entered World War I the son of a Civil War general had become a lieutenant colonel.

He had seen service in Cuba and in the Boxer Rebellion. He had, on his return from China, been assigned as chemistry instructor at West Point, then had gone on to become an honor graduate in 1909 of the Army School of the Line, and in 1910 had graduated from the Army Staff College. Appointed to the General Staff in 1911, the future general began his great fight for a sound militia system. In that year Secretary of War Stimson and Chief of Staff Leonard Wood directed Captain Palmer to draw up a plan in which a citizen army would become a reality, in other words, a plan for universal peacetime military service. This plan was published in Stimson's Annual Report for 1912 and was entitled *Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States*. But Congress, supposedly believing in a slowly expanding regular Army, did not approve of the plan. Later on the National Defense Act of 1920 and the Selective Service Act of 1940 would embody some of the ideas of Palmer's *Report of 1912*, and of George Washington's plan for a well-trained militia (*Sentiments on a Peace Establishment*, 1783) which Palmer found buried in the Washington Papers in the Library of Congress.

Palmer, away from the Staff for four years, returned in 1916 as a major, and from then until May 1917 was busily occupied with plans for the hasty organization of a war time Army. As lieutenant colonel, he went to France with Pershing in May 1917, as First Assistant Chief of Staff of the AEF, and before the war was over commanded the 58th Infantry Brigade in the Meuse-Argonne campaign. Following the Armistice, Colonel Palmer went back to the Staff at Pershing's request to work on the post-war military establishment. He also became official military adviser of the Senate Military Affairs Committee during the "great debate" in progress over what was to become the National Defense Act of 1920.

General Palmer retired from the Army in 1926, after three years as brigadier general. His retirement in the days before World War II was marked by study of and research on American military history and policy, and in this quiet period he wrote two of his outstanding books, *Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen* (1930), and *America In Arms* (1941). These works have become required reading for all persons interested in the history of American military institutions and policy. This pleasant period ended when Palmer returned to active duty in 1941 at the request of General Marshall. The old soldier, now past three-score and ten, became one of the leading consultants on the organization of the huge Army of World War II, just as he had the same sort of thing for the World War I Army a quarter of a century earlier. Then, for the last time, he retired in 1946 at the age of 76.

Any comment on John McAuley Palmer's career would be superfluous. The United States Army does not brag about its great men.

*Compiled by Robert W. Davis.

BRITISH NAVY ATOMIC EXERCISE

BY NOWELL HALL

I have just watched an exercise in the central Mediterranean that will make history. Like all these British and N.A.T.O. events that have taken place in European waters, "Sea Lance," as this large-scale sea-air exercise was named, was chiefly concerned with convoy protection and the safeguarding of of thermo-nuclear weapons. "Sea Lance" in the vital sea communications. But though it demonstrated that strategy is unchanging, it had the "new look" imposed by the impact its overall conception resembled the pattern likely to be followed for all big national or N.A.T.O. sea practices in future.

The setting of this exercise was not exceptional. Taking part were the forces of Orange and Blue who were assumed to be at war. The French Riviera coast, the west coast of Italy and part of the North African coast were Orange. Sicily and Malta, and certain airfields lent for the exercise by France and Italy, were Blue. Against them were ranged the forces of Black, an idealist military dictatorship believing in World Peace at any price, and therefore waging war quite impartially on both sides to bring the struggle to an end.

Taking part were fifty ships of the British Home and Mediterranean Fleets, and some 150 aircraft of the Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm. Every year, after the British Home Fleet's spring cruise, the two fleets hold combined exercises. This year's was more ambitious than usual. Among ships participating were four cruisers, the Albion and Centaur, two of Britain's newest aircraft carriers, seven powerful Daring class ships are, in effect, light cruisers, six of the Navy's latest streamlined anti-submarine frigates (these are designed chiefly for atomic warfare, having all crew working spaces enclosed, a periscope being used to enable a

ship to be navigated from the chartroom below the bridge during an emergency); and several submarines, among them the Trunchoon, converted into a streamlined type of boat to give her a high underwater speed. For the first time a royal yacht was involved in such an exercise. The Britannia, which had gone straight to the Mediterranean after Princess Margaret's West Indies tour, took part both as a commodore of convoy, and in her wartime role of hospital ship. On board as observers were the Duke of Edinburgh, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the First Sea Lord, and the Fifth Sea Lord.

"Sea Lance," planned and directed by Admiral Denny, C.-in-C., Home Fleet, in close cooperation with Air Officer Commanding, Malta, emphasized two important points:

1. That in all maritime operations, sea and air forces are not competitive but complementary;

2. That defensive measures against atomic attack at sea can be taken by all warships, be they old or new.

Some difficult situations were visualized calling for revision or rather adjustment of tactics. For instance, south of Sardinia a task force of thirty-odd ships was replenished by fleet auxiliaries, taking on fuel and stores while under the constant threat of atomic and submarine attack. It was a pretty problem, for concentration, to be under protection of escorts, is demanded against submarine attack, whereas dispersal is the method of countering atomic attack.

But it was towards the end of the exercise, while a convoy was being escorted towards Malta, that we saw something of the measures likely to be taken by fleets against atomic assault. The surge which follows an underwater atomic explosion was simulated by a ship turning downwind and making smoke.

A while before, fearing such an attack, all ships had adopted an open formation,

each being thousands of yards from her neighbor and the whole fleet thus covering an immense area of sea.

This alone was a major departure from established practice: in all other large-scale exercises I have attended, formations of ships turning downwind and making smoke, weapons have been compact and consequently more readily manageable.

When a "victim" on the horizon began making smoke, at a distance suggesting that we were on the fringe of the fallout area (if this had been a genuine underwater atomic burst) several things happened in H.M.S. Apollo, the 11 year old fast mine-layer in which I was taking passage. Presumably similar things were happening in every ship present.

As soon as we got warning of atomic attack, hoses were turned on, and began to spray sea water over the hull and superstructure, thus continually washing surfaces that might be contaminated by radio-active particles from the fallout. All members of the crew were ordered below deck, officers and men, wearing anti-flash gear and gas masks, being sent down where possible to those parts of the ship near or below the water-line to obtain maximum protection from gamma rays. The bridge was vacated, and the ship was navigated by radar from the chartroom beneath it. The boiler rooms, where forced draught is essential, were left unattended, and ventilation to the engine room, where the staff remained on duty, was shut off for the time being. Thus the Apollo, turning away from the distant drifting "atomic" cloud, was able to steam clear of the area, moving by herself for several minutes at a speed of more than 30 knots.

In common with all the other ships in sight, the upper deck during this period was deserted. With the exception of the boiler room, the vessel was hermetically sealed, all

doors and openings being closed and, as far as possible, all sources of contamination being eliminated. Many protective measures can be taken by "pre-atomic" ships to minimize casualties from flash and radiation.

New weapons and equipment which will eventually be available to all the N.A.T.O. navies were used in the exercise. Naval jet aircraft which have been put into squadron service recently were operated from the carriers Centaur and Albion, each of over 20,000 tons. Each of these new vessels, contributing powerfully to the offensive power of the British Fleet, is equipped with the angled deck, making possible the safer landing of high-speed aircraft. The Centaur also carried a squadron of big Whirlwind helicopters equipped with the dipping asdic, a deadly new device for detecting submerged submarines. It is lowered into the sea enabling the crew of the helicopter to locate and track their quarry by means of this sensitive "ear." Opposing submarines learned to respect the device, which was used in "Sea Lance" by a striking force supporting the convoy escort.

There is little doubt that "Sea Lance," the first such exercise in European waters to be attended by newspaper representatives, will be followed by other big "atomic age" practices along the same lines.

MURALS FOR EISENHOWER MUSEUM

Louis Bouche, N.A. and Ross Moffet, N.A. have been awarded commissions to execute four large murals to be placed in the hall of the Eisenhower Foundation at Abilene, Kansas under the terms of the Mary Gertrude Abbey Bequest. The murals will depict the leading historical events in the career of General Eisenhower.

Founded by the citizens of Abilene to honor veterans of America's wars, the building is to house the war memorials and other mementos which have been presented to the Foundation by the President.

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Some significant events of American history are described in handbooks for *Fort Laramie National Monument, Wyoming*, and *Vicksburg National Military Park, Mississippi*, published recently by the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior.

Copies of these publications (Nos. 20 and 21, respectively, of the Historical Handbook Series) are obtainable by purchase from the Superintendent of Documents in Washington, D. C., for 25 cents.

David L. Hieb, author of the handbook for Fort Laramie, points out therein that perhaps no other single historic site is so intimately connected with the history of the Old West. He tells the story of the first Fort Laramie, constructed in 1834, its years of use as a military outpost guarding the overland trails to the Far West, and its establishment as a national monument in 1938 by Presidential proclamation.

In the Vicksburg handbook, its author, William C. Everhart, retraces the operations on land, river, and bayou of the Confederate and Union forces during the lengthy campaign and siege of Vicksburg which ended with the formal surrender of that Confederate stronghold to the Union Army on July 4th, 1863. "The Confederate troops," writes Everhart in describing this surrender scene, "marched out from their defenses and stacked their rifles, cartridge boxes, and flags before a hushed Union Army which witnessed the historic event without cheering—a testimonial of their respect for the courageous defenders of Vicksburg whose line was never broken."

Each handbook contains a number of maps and historical pictures, and each has an area guide for the use of visitors.

SEAWAY PENS AND FORT DETROIT

Three of the pens used by President Eisenhower in signing the St. Lawrence Seaway Bill, authorizing the United States to join Canada in building the new waterway between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean, were made from wood recovered from Fort Detroit, the last British-held fort in the United States.

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current history program we envision for the Military Establishment is in the short run an important management or staff tool—a means for studying operational and administrative experience and for deriving therefrom important planning and other studies. Every professionally-minded officer ought to view it in such fashion and viewing it thus become its advocate. In the long run a sound current history program can enable the Military Establishment to see itself in perspective and produce at quadrennial, decennial, or other intervals historical studies of substance. Were such a program carried on throughout the Government we would create a record of incalculable value.

The subject is at a critical juncture, as we understand it, for the Army is engaged in studying the matter. Since there are historians of the old school who can see little or no value in current history, but rather seek to water down the existing program by inaction, if not by outright opposition, all friends of the current history idea—all who see undoubted values in it—must use their influence not only to save the program but to improve it and to seek the adoption of a uniform program throughout the Military Establishment.

PJS.

EDITORIAL



NEEDED—A UNIFORM CURRENT HISTORY PROGRAM

A uniform current history program greater in both scope and depth than that of the Army requiring an annual "Summary of Major Events and Problems" (see D/A Memo 335-80-1, 14 July 1953) is urged for the entire Military Establishment. The kind of a program we have in mind is a uniform program along the lines suggested by the Navy's directive of 12 June 1951 (OPNAV Instructions 575.2) or the Air Forces' program laid down for all commands and numbered air forces (in AFM 210-1, 15 September 1952). Such a program is current in the sense that it is never more than six months to two years behind events, requires a regular reporting system, is on a continuing basis, and requires the preparation of well-rounded, documented narrative accounts at regular stated intervals. A program of this kind requires support of the highest authorities, for it is only with such support that the historian can "dig into the background of controversial or embarrassing issues and come out with the answers that approximate the truth," as one Army historian has put it.

The Army, in its "Summary of Major Events and Problems" requirement, has only the beginnings of such a program, and even this is in danger. It is known that there is not always full support for the excellent Air Force program.

The histories resulting from a current history program are certainly not definitive studies, and no historian can properly claim that they are, for only time and perspective can produce such studies, but they are not "public relations documents" either. Instead they are classified documents (in most cases) for the immediate and later use of the preparing agencies and their higher echelons.

Not only the narrative accounts have immediate and permanent historical value as preliminary historical studies, but their accompanying documentation in the form of appended correspondence and other key records make for the creation of a valuable historical archive as the years go by.

This leads us to another significant facet of the subject—the problem of massive documentation with which all Government historians, particularly military historians, are familiar. But at the same time that the records have become "terrifying" in their bulk the use of tele-communications in the conduct of both public and private affairs has caused to be "written on air" evidence that formerly would have been committed to paper. The American Historical Association called attention to this paradox in a committee report issued in 1952.

Thus, historians and policy-makers alike must be convinced that the history of our times can never be adequately written unless historians continually attack the massive documentation of modern government as well as seek the essential information which does not get into the written record. Indeed, without the constant labors of historians we may not even be able to preserve the key written records, for they may be lost in the Gargantuan masses of paper and even entered on destruction schedules. For many long years historians fought for a national archives; now they must fight for a comprehensive current historical program to complement the archival program which is so well established.

But, staying on top of the documentation is not our only concern—vital as that problem is on every level of government—for the

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